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A MODERATE AND RESTRAINED 
FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILITY 
BILL: TARGETING THE CRISIS 
AREAS FOR RESOLUTION 
Aaron D. Twerski* 
The drive for the enactment of a federal product liability bill 
continues unabated. 1 For the sixth time in as many years, the 
proponents of legislative reform will lock horns with those who 
seek to protect the common law system from encroachment by 
the business lobby.2 The committee hearings over the years have 
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1. See S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S218 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) 
[hereinafter cited as S. 100]. 
2. Federal legislative activity began with the promulgation of the Model Uniform 
Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MUPLA], by the 
United States Department of Commerce. The following bills have been introduced in 
Congress: H.R. 5626, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 28,678 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as H.R. 5626]; H.R. 7000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. REc. 7428 (1980) [herein-
after cited as H.R. 7000] (virtually identical to MUPLA); H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 127 CoNG. REC. H9529 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 5214]; 
H.R. 5261, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H9928 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981); S. 2631, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CoNG. REc. S6878 (daily ed. June 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 
S. 2631] (reported with amendments by a unanimous Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation on December 1 (legislative day Nov. 30), 1982. S. REP. No. 
670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)); H.R. 2729, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REC. H2328 
(daily ed. Apr. 25, 1983) (hereinafter cited as H.R. 2729]; S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 
CONG. REc. S90 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) [hereinafter cited as S. 44] (S. 44 is virtually 
identical to S. 2631, and was reported with amendments by a vote of 13-2 to the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on May 23 (legislative day May 
21), 1984. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)). 
Legislative hearings have generated intense interest from both consumer and industzy 
groups. See To Establish Standards and Procedures for Determining Legal and Finan-
cial Responsibilities in Product Liability Actions: Hearing on H.R. 5626 Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); To Regulate Interstate Commerce by 
Providing for a Uniform Product Liability Law, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 
2631 Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as S. 2631 Hearings]; 
To Regulate Interstate Commerce by Providing for a Uniform Product Liability Law, 
and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 44 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the 
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1 
(1983) and 2d Sess., Part 2 (1984) [hereinafter cited as S. 44 Hearings]. 
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taken on the aura of an old-time Wes tern. The guys in the 
"white hats" (consumer groups) speak of the glories of the com-
mon law system.3 The guys in the "black hats" (the business as-
sociations) relate horror stories of righteous corporations driven 
out of business because of the ludicrous decisions of common 
law courts.• Off-stage some have begun to question the necessity 
3. S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 294 (statement of Sybil Shainwald, Na-
tional Women's Health Network): "S. 44 will not only wipe out present rights but will 
also stagnate innovation and development in the field of product liability law. It is the 
state courts that have sought to accommodate social needs and to do justice in the face 
of an ever-increasing technological society.").See also id. (Part 2) at 389. (statement of 
Charles B. O'Reilly, Counsel, on behalf of Asbestos Victims of America): 
In the proper exercise of the states' Constitutional right to enact laws for the 
protection of their citizens and property, almost all states have adopted product 
liability laws. These laws invariably included principles of strict liability. 
The legitimate state interest protected by these strict liability principles was 
and is the health and welfare of its citizens. The public policy underlying strict 
liability principles recognized that strict liability provided the only fair and eq-
uitable means to (i) compensate the victims, and (ii) provide financial motiva-
tion for industry to consider safety. 
Id. at 402 (letter of Hon. Robert Abrams, Att'y Gen. of New York): 
Given the preemptive nature of this bill, the broad brush with which it paints, 
and its endorsement by an administration supposedly dedicated to a "new feder-
alism", one would be led to believe that it addresses severe problems that are 
currently being ignored at the state level. But the truth of the matter is that 
while there are indeed some large awards and some variations in results among 
jurisdictions, no crisis exists. To the contrary, the present law is necessary to 
provide the minimal protection to consumers and should, if anything, be 
strengthened. 
4. See S. 44 Hearings (Part 2), supra note 2, at 426 (testimony and statement of 
Robert D. Rogers, Senior Vice President, Lubbock Mfg. Co.): 
In 1975 our company was subject to a rude awakening. We had been in the 
business of making and developing systems for the safe handling of hazardous 
material for some 45 years. We have had an exemplary record, but we had a tank 
trailer that had been 10 years on the road, probably 1 million miles, and it was 
involved in a horrible accident. There was evidence the driver had been 
speeding. 
At that time, the investigation by the State and Federal Government, the Na-
tional Transportation Department, had proved there was nothing wrong with 
our product. However, as a result of that accident, we had a $50 million judg-
ment against us and other defendants. About half of that ended up being 
awarded against us, not because the jury intended it that way, but because of 
the concept of strict liability and other problems in Texas law at that time. 
This accident resulted in our insurance premiums being raised from some 
$22,000 to $650,000. It eventually resulted in our going out of business. 
Id. (Part 1) at 356-57 (letter of Durant A. Hunter, Vice President, James Hunter Mach. 
Co., Inc.): 
After witnessing the legal gymnastics which our manufacturing company has 
had to perform, I am not surprised at the dearth of aspiring leaders in American 
manufacturing. The problems of a manufacturer mirrow [sic] those of society in 
the staggering number of lawsuits springing up everywhere. My family has been 
involved in the manufacturing business for 136 years. One month ago, James 
Hunter Machine Company, Inc. filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, not so much because business conditions are poor, but 
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for any legislation.~ The crisis atmosphere, which reached fever 
because of a little understood, yet all too familiar concern of American manufac-
turers-product liability . 
. . . We filed Chapter 11 because the current status of product liability laws 
made it impossible to continue. After two recent court battles and a quarter of a 
million dollars in payments, we had the choice of fighting with lawyers the rest 
of our lives or fiiing for reorganization. At the present time we have been named 
in 20 suits. A review of only those claims where a specific demand had been 
made (only one-half the claims) discloses product liability demands in excess of 
$17 million. We know of 11 additional accidents which may result in suits, and 
live with the uncertainty of future accidents on which we have no control. 
S. 2631 Hearings, supra note 2, at 31-32 (testimony of Arthur Rosen on behalf of Special 
Comm. for Workplace Product Liability Reform): 
Product liability is a noose over my head. My company presently has four 
liability suits pending. The largest is for $21 million. I am presently insured, but 
what does that do? Our limit is $500,000. The $21 million claim is for the death 
of a person caused by his breaking his company rules. He was running a small 
lathe which we sold in 1972 for $2,750. This machine was built in 1944 and had 
run adequately for almost 40 years. The person was wearing loose clothing which 
caught in the machine while he apparently was climbing over the machine and 
kicked or pushed in the clutch. 
This lathe is a current state-of-the-art machine. This accident could happen 
on a brand new machine. As I also understand the accident, he was operating 
the machine during a break in time against company rules. If we lose and the 
judgment is rendered over $1 million or even less, that is the end of my com-
pany, 26 years of work, the jobs of 25 people. 
Id. at 114 (statement of Peter Voss, President, Voss Equip., Inc.): 
I do not mind telling the subcommittee I am scared. The specter of a devastat-
ing product liability case haunts my business on an almost daily basis. A pend-
ing case involving a fellow Pennsylvania material handling equipment distribu-
tor is a prime example. The distributor did not sell the truck to the user, nor 
control its use. Yet an $18.8 million judgment was just rendered against him and 
the manufacturer. If this decision holds, it will more than likely wipe the distrib-
utor out of business. 
While I am here today to talk about my own product liability problems, my 
statement reflects the serious concerns of thousands of other wholesale-distribu-
tors throughout the country. For our industry, today's maze of product liability 
laws represents an utter lack of control over circumstances which give rise to 
liability, the lack of uniformity, and lack of equity and common sense. 
Id. at 237 (testimony of William D. Ford, Coalition for Uniform Product Liability Law, 
and General Counsel, Colt Indus., Inc.): 
In the case of asbestos-related diseases, over 16,000 suits have been filed, and 
unknown numbers of future product liability claims may be made. One Yale 
University economist has estimated that the cost of these claims may range from 
$38 billion to as much as $90 billion. 
Not only is the continued existence of some manufacturers of asbestos prod-
ucts threatened, but a number have received qualified opinions from their audi-
tors because of their potential exposure. Some experts have questioned whether 
the American property casualty insurance industry can withstand the magnitude 
of the claims expected to result. 
5. See S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 174-75 (testimony of Hon. Dennis 
DeConcini, Senator from Arizona); S. 2631 Hearings, supra note 2, at 17-19 (statement 
of Jerry J. Phillips, W.P. Toms Professor of Law, University of Tennessee); Kircher, 
Federal Product Legislation and Toxic Torts: The Defense Perspective, 28 VILL. L. REV. 
1116 (1982-83); Page & Stephens, The Product Liability Insurance "Crisis": Causes, 
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pitch several years ago when small manufacturers could not ob-
tain insurance, has abated.6 It appears unseemly, almost un-
American, for the federal government to legislate in an area so 
long delegated to the states unless there exists a "crisis" of seis-
mic proportions threatening widespread destruction of business 
interests.7 Behind the set in small jam-packed rooms, business-
men load their respective revolvers with live ammunition to be 
directed not against consumers but against their brethren should 
any of them suggest the deletion of some pet word, phrase, or 
section that would otherwise give succor to a particular 
industry.8 
In this circus-like atmosphere, relatively few have reflected on 
the overall performance of the courts in these years of change. 9 
Have there been excesses and if so, are they subject to legislative 
correction? If legislation is called for, what should be its gestalt? 
How will any proposed legislation mesh with the existing body 
of precedent firmly in place in both products and general tort 
law? What transaction costs are involved in putting a new prod-
uct liability code in place? With fifty independent and sovereign 
states interpreting a statute, can there be much hope for the 
kind of uniformity that will give clear direction to designers and 
engineers charged with the responsibility of bringing the product 
to the marketplace? 
Nostrums, and Cures, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 387 (1984). 
6. S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 176-78 (statement of Hon. Bruce Babbitt, 
Governor of Arizona); Page & Stephens, supra note 5. But see NATIONAL MACHINE TooL 
BUILDERS' ASSOCIATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY DIGEST (Mar. 12, 1985) (reporting that prod-
uct liability insurance premiums, which peaked in 1979, are on the rise again). 
7. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1984) (minority views of Ernest F. Hol-
lings, Senator from South Carolina). 
8. It is difficult to support this proposition with authority. It is, however, a matter of 
common knowledge that the infighting between industry groups has been substantial. 
One can only explain the continued insistence to include politically unpalatable provi-
sions dealing with such subjects as product misuse and alterations, unavoidably unsafe 
products, and government contract defenses as a reflection of the dogged insistence of 
particular industries to build statutory protection for their product line. The prolifera-
tion of these and similar "pet" provisions has engendered substantial opposition and 
endangered the legislative effort. 
9. But see Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to 
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980); Henderson, 
Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudica-
tion, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, Conscious Design 
Choices]; Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: 
Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as Henderson, Defective Product Design]; Owen, Rethinking the Policies of 
Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980); Reed & Watkins, Product Liabil-
ity Tort Reform: The Case for Federal Action, 63 NEB. L. REV. 389 (1984); Wade, On 
Product 'Design Defects' and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551 (1980). 
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Legislative standards in an area that is so heavily litigated 
must be comprehensible not only to the parties who must live by 
them but also to the courts that must utilize them for judging.10 
One must thus ask whether courts can administer the standards 
and how they will translate them into jury instructions. Finally, 
in an area so heavily politicized by outrageous rhetoric over the 
years, 11 the legislation, if it is to succeed, must survive the legis-
lative process. Although two bills have been reported out of 
committee in successive years, neither has reached the Senate 
floor for a vote. 12 There is every reason to expect that the House 
of Representatives will be more hostile than the Senate to legis-
lation that constricts consumer rights. 18 If this year's efforts are 
to be more than jousting with windmills, reflections on the kind 
of bill likely to draw broad-based support become important. 
In this article I have tried to offer a rational, feasible, and po-
litically acceptable solution to the present product liability cri-
sis. To do this, I have first set out the problem. I explain in Part 
IO. See Henderson, Process Constraint3 in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 911-14 
(1982). 
11. See S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 202 (testimony of Karl Asch, 
Counsel): 
Strict liability is a concept now which has been adopted after years of evolution 
in the several States, and it would appear to me from my own unsophisticated 
point of view that perhaps this bill would more appropriately be called the man-
ufacturers and distributors and insurance companies' defective products escape 
from responsibility and whatever you do, get rid of strict liability act. 
S. 2631 Hearings, supra note 2, at 62 (testimony of Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director, Public 
Citizens Health Research Group): "The past year has seen an unprecedented assault by 
business acting as the ventriloquist for Ronald Reagan and his colleagues, designed to .. 
. weaken not only Government regulation of health and safety but also to cripple the 
flow of information to consumers ... . ";Id.at 101 (testimony of James H. Mack, Public 
Affairs Director, Nat'! Mach. Tool Builders Ass'n): "Our view is, that in the area of prod-
uct liability, the experimentation by courts and legislatures in 50 states has created an 
end result affecting interstate commerce that looks like it was evolved by Dr. 
Strangelove."; Id. at 106 (statement of Emmet W. McCarthy, Vice President, Product 
Reliability, Dreis and Krump Mfg. Co.): "Our dilemma, then, is not that we lose a lot of 
cases in the courtroom, but that we get sued a lot. The current roulette wheel system 
with no stable rules encourages 'sue and hope' syndrome." (emphasis in original); Id. at 
281 (testimony of Delby Humphrey, Chairman, Schutt Mfg. Co.): "The time for deciding 
the fate of football in America is at hand. The sport will not survive the tremendous 
financial pressures imposed upon it by today's litigation." 
12. S. 2631, supra note 2, was reported with amendments by a unanimous Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on December 1 (legislative day 
November 30), 1982. S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982). S. 44, supra note 2, 
which is virtually identical to S. 2631, was reported with amendments 13-2 by the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on May 23 (legislative day May 
21), 1984. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
13. The current Congress (the 99th) has .54 Republicans and 46 Democrats in the 
Senate and 180 Republicans and 225 Democrats in the House. The Democratic majority 
in the House will probably be less receptive to legislation constricting consumer rights. 
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I how courts have created the crisis by formulating incompre-
hensible legal standards. In Part II, I examine the difficulties 
with assessing punitive damages against a defendant. In Part III, 
I discuss the conflict between the torts and workers' compensa-
tion systems. In Part IV, I reflect on the need to protect whole-
salers and retailers from needless litigation. Part V suggests that 
a federal study on the role of damages in product liability litiga-
tion be undertaken. I then explain in Part VI why Congress need 
only address these five problem areas to resolve the crisis, and in 
Part VII, I present my proposed statute. 
I. THE CRISIS OF INCOMPREHENSIBLE STANDARDS 
The naysayers notwithstanding, there exists a product liability 
crisis that deserves the immediate attention of Congress. The 
crisis does not arise from the unavailability of insurance, nor 
does it stem from the high cost of that insurance. The source of 
the unrest lies in the lack of comprehensibility of the law to 
those whose behavior the law seeks to control or modify. This 
incomprehensibility either rests in or is exacerbated by the un-
manageable open-endedness of the law which makes it un-
fathomable to courts. Three recent cases will illustrate the point. 
A. Barker-Campbell-Open-Ended Liability 
By now everyone probably knows of California's major contri-
bution to the product liability crisis, Barker v. Lull Engineering 
Co. 14 One will recall that in Barker the plaintiff was injured at a 
construction site while operating a high-lift loader manufactured 
by the defendant, Lull Engineering Co. The plaintiff had used 
the loader to lift a load of lumber on terrain that sloped sharply 
in several directions. The injury occurred when the load was 
lifted approximately twenty feet above ground. Due to the sharp 
slope, the load of lumber shifted and forced the plaintiff to jump 
from the loader. A piece of falling lumber struck him and caused 
serious injuries. 
The plaintiff contended that the loader had a number of de-
sign defects. First, it did not have outriggers to lend stability to 
the loader and thus prevent its tipping on difficult terrain. Sec-
ond, it had no roll bars or seat belts to protect the operator in 
14. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). 
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the event the machine rolled over. Finally, it lacked an auto-
matic locking device on the leveling lever to prevent inadvertent 
bumping by the operator. 
The Barker court held that a product may be found defective 
in design under either of two alternative tests: 
First, a product may be found defective in design if . 
the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary 
consumer would expect when used in an intended or rea-
sonably foreseeable manner. Second, a product may al-
ternatively be found defective in design if . . . the bene-
fits of the challenged design [do not] outweigh the risk of 
danger inherent in such design. 111 
The mere fact that the California court adopted a "consumer 
expectation test" for defect did not pre-ordain that industry 
would find it incomprehensible and courts would find it unman-
ageable. Courts could have narrowed the test's scope to give it 
meaning.16 
Nevertheless, in Campbell v. General Motors, Inc. 11 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court fulfilled the expectations of those who 
predicted that the adoption of a "consumer expectation" test 
would invite jury lawlessness and foster open-ended liability 
15. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38. 
16. A precisely defined and appropriately limited consumer expectation test that fo-
cuses exclusively on normal or "core uses" could govern cases not addressed by either 
risk-utility analysis or the express warranty provision of U.C.C. § 2-313 (1985). Adver-
tisements, the product's self image, uses to which consumers have put the product in the 
past, and other similar intangible factors significantly influence consumer behavior. 
Product image, which is a function of these sensory impressions and subsequent expecta-
tions, creates an objective expectation that the express warranty does not cover. Further-
more, although the manufacturer's risk-utility balancing takes into account the con-
sumer's perception of product image, the risk-utility formula does not adequately protect 
these "soft" product expectations. 
As set forth in Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the 
Rule of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 861 
(1983), strict liability theory provides no place for an independent standard that meas-
ures abstract expectations of product performance in terms of a jury's subjective experi-
ence. On the other hand, if liability turns on whether the use of the allegedly defective 
product fell within the core of uses indigenous to the product and whether the product 
failed in that normal use, then the consumer expectation'prong could serve an important 
role. The court, however, must decide the threshold question whether the consumer was 
using the product according to this normal expected use. If the court determines that the 
use falls within the "core uses," then the jury can safely decide whether the product was 
defective for that expected use. In those cases where the court finds that the consumer 
used this product outside of the norm (but still very possibly foreseeahly) then risk-
utility analysis provides the only appropriate standard. For an application of this thesis 
to Barker and other cases, see id. at 895-930. 
17. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982). 
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against manufacturers.18 In that case, the plaintiff, a sixty-two-
year old woman, boarded a bus manufactured by General Mo-
tors. When she first boarded the bus, she sat in a double seat, 
but she later decided to sit down on the first .forward-facing sin-
gle seat on the right side of the bus. The bus had a horizontal 
metal "grab bar" attached at shoulder level above the back of 
!ach forward-facing seat. Because the plaintiff's seat faced the 
3ide of a lateral-facing doubl_e seat she did not have access to a 
metal "grab bar." The only handrail directly in front of plaintiff 
was the metal armrest attached, at about waist level, to the side 
of her seat. Although the bus had a number of vertical poles, 
which extended to the ceiling, there were none by the plaintiff's 
seat. 
As the bus entered the intersection, the plaintiff knew that it 
was about to make a right-hand turn. The bus driver turned 
sharply, and the bus gained speed. The force propelled the 
plaintiff from her seat, and she sought to break her fall by grab-
bing onto something. Because no guardrails or handrails were 
available, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries in the fall. In her 
subsequent lawsuit, the plaintiff cited the failure to install a pole 
or handrail in the vicinity of the first forward-facing seat as a 
design defect. 
In reversing the trial court's grant of a nonsuit to General Mo-
tors, the California court set forth the requirements for estab-
lishing a prima facie case of design defect. Under the Barker 
test, the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case if she sug-
gested a design alternative that would have avoided the injury to 
her. 19 At that point the burden of proof switched to the defen-
18. The consumer expectation test essentially maintains that courts should hold lia-
ble a manufacturer who leads consumers to believe that a product will perform at a 
certain level and then disappoints those expectations. See supra note 16. MUPLA, supra 
note 2, provides the rebuttal to this argument. The drafters of MUPLA were among 
those who forewarned of the insurmountable problem associated with a consumer expec-
tation test. In explaining the omission of the test from the statute they wrote: 
Neither the formula nor the detailed list of the more important evidentiary 
items includes what has been called the "consumer expectation test." The rea-
sons for not including it are rooted in both economics and practicality . . . . The 
consumer expectation test takes subjectivity in its most extreme end. Each trier 
of fact is likely to have a different understanding of abstract consumer expecta-
tions. Moreover, most consumers are not familiar with the details of manufactur-
ing process and cannot abstractly evaluate conscious design alternatives. 
Id. § 104 analysis; see also Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 
Miss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973). 
19. Read literally, the Barker rule requires only that the plaintiff demonstrate that 
the product design "proximately caused" the injury. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 
143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. Nevertheless, as Professor Gary Schwartz explains, it would be 
very poor strategy for a plaintiff to pass up the opportunity of getting the jury to con-
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dant to establish that the product it manufactured met risk-util-
ity standards and did not present "excessive preventable dan-
ger."20 The court correctly noted that under the second leg of 
the Barker test the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, 
and therefore the lower court should not have granted the 
nonsuit. 21 
Of greater interest is the California court's treatment of the 
first prong of Barker which permits the plaintiff to establish her 
case if the product failed to satisfy ordinary consumer expecta-
tions as to safety. The court found that the plaintiff had estab-
lished a prim a facie case of defect on this ground as well. In 
delineating the proof necessary to establish a prima facie case, 
the court did not require expert testimony. 22 Instead, it said that 
sider his version of the design issue before the manufacturer presents his pro-product 
evidence. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435 
(1979). In fact, unless plaintiff's evidence suggesting any design defect is exceptionally 
weak, the plaintiff will not use the literal Barker rule because in practice it gives the 
defendant first crack at the jury and relegates the plaintiff to the defensive counterat-
tack. See also Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 607-09. Like the plaintiff in Barker, most 
plaintiffs will offer several design alternatives in order to establish a tactically effective 
prima facie case. 
20. 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. 
21. Many commentators· have criticized the relative ease with which the Barker 
plaintiff can make out a prima facie case. See Henderson, Defective Product Design, 
supra note 9, at 784-85. See generally Schwartz, supra note 19, at 464-71. Although the 
well-advised plaintiff will go beyond the literal Barker rule, see supra note 19, in essence, 
the plaintiff can reach the jury merely by alleging some evidence of design alternatives 
that might have avoided the injury. Some argue that this presents a problem because the 
court cannot direct a verdict for the defendant in cases that are simply too fragile to go 
to a jury. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
22. The court said: 
Here, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to have the case submitted to the 
jury on this theory as well. Not only did she testify about the accident (her use 
of the product), but she also introduced photographic evidence of the design 
features of the bus. This evidence was sufficient to establish the objective condi-
tions of the product. The other essential aspect of this test involves the jurors' 
own sense of whether the product meets ordinary expectations as to its safety 
under the circumstances presented by the evidence. Since public transportation 
is a matter of common experiepce, no expert testimony was required to enable 
the jury to reach a decision on this part of the Barker inquiry. 
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive what testimony an "expert" could provide. 
The thrust of the first Barker test is that the product must meet the safety 
expectations of the general public as represented by the ordinary consumer, not 
the industry or a government agency. "[O}ne can hardly imagine what creden-
tials a witness must possess before he can be certified as an expert on the issue 
of ordinary consumer expectations." (Schwartz, Understanding Products Liabil-
ity, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 480 (1979).) 
The quantum of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of design de-
fect under the first prong of Barker cannot be reduced to an easy formula. How-
ever, if the product is one within the common experience of ordinary consumers, 
it is generally sufficient if the plaintiff provides evidence concerning (1) his or 
her use of the product; (2) the circumstances surrounding the injury; and (3) the 
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"it is generally sufficient if the plaintiff provides evidence con-
cerning (1) his or her use of the product; (2) the circumstances 
surrounding the injury; and (3) the objective features of the 
product which are relevant to an evaluation of its safety."23 
To understand the broad sweep of this decision, one must re-
flect on the fact that the "consumer expectation" test operates 
independently from the risk-utility test.24 Thus, even if the de-
fendant had carried its burden of proof by establishing that to 
have placed a pole adjacent to the plaintiff's seat would have 
created greater dangers than it would have prevented, the plain-
tiff would still have won if the jury found that the product failed 
to meet the consumer's expectations. One searches in vain for 
any standard that gives content to the consumer expectation 
test in this case. The plaintiff's testimony that she rides buses 
regularly and did not expect that this bus would cause her injury 
appears sufficient to make out a prima facie case of design 
defect. 
The Barker and Campbell decisions have created a crisis of 
comprehensibility for responsible manufacturers. To be told that 
objective features of the product which are relevant to an evaluation of its 
safety. That evidence was provided in this case. Therefore, appellant was enti-
tled to a jury determination concerning whether the bus satisfied ordinary con-
sumer expectations. 
32 Cal. 3d at 126-27, 649 P.2d at 232-33, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. 
One can question the court's reliance on Professor Gary Schwartz's analysis of the role 
of the expert witness in this context. Professor Schwartz rejects the use of the consumer 
expectation test as an independent liability standard (except under narrowly circum-
scribed conditions) because it raises prospects of "haphazard impressionistic jury deci-
sion-making." Schwartz, supra note 19, at 480. While Schwartz takes issue with an "ex-
pert" testifying on matters of the victim's pre-injury expectations, he also questions the 
reliability and admissibility of the consumer-victim's after-the-fact testimony that the 
product failed to meet his expectations. Id. Moreover, Schwartz disagrees with the the-
ory that the jurors themselves represent ordinary consumers who can identify consumer 
expectations, id., which appears to be the premise underlying the Campbell result. 
23. 32 Cal. 3d at 127, 649 P.2d at 233, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 900. 
24. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38. The 
court's language is unmistakenly clear: 
A product may be found defective in design so as to subject a manufacturer to 
strict liability for resulting injuries, under either of two alternative tests. First, a 
product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the 
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when 
used in an intended or reasonably forseeable manner. Second, a product may 
alternatively be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the 
product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to estab-
lish, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance, the benefits of the chal-
lenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Campbell, 32 Cal. 3d at 118, 649 P.2d at 227, 184 Cal. 
Rptr. at 894, where the California court reiterates: "In Barker, two alternative tests were 
established for determining whether a product is defectively designed." 
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the defendant must bear the burden· of proof on risk-utility 
presents a serious problem; it virtually wipes out the possibility 
of winning a design defect case on directed verdict because the 
party with the burden of proof rarely wins on directed verdict. 211 
In all but the utterly frivolous design case, the defendant will 
have to face the vagaries of a jury. It then adds insult to injury 
to tell the defendant that, even if it carries that onerous burden, 
the plaintiff will have a second bite at the apple by submitting 
the case to the jury with nothing more than the testimony of the 
plaintiff that as an ordinary consumer she did not expect to be 
injured. Manufacturers have considerable justification for the 
belief that, in California, they cannot successfully defend design 
defect cases. 26 
25. See Schwartz, supra note 19. Professor Schwartz, in criticizing the Barker bur-
den-of-proof rule, states: 
[O]ne simply cannot talk meaningfully about a risk-benefit defect in a product 
design until and unless one has identified some design alternative (including any 
design omission) that can serve as the basis for a risk-benefit analysis. If the 
Barker rule is read literally, however, it fails to require the plaintiff even to 
point to an alternative of this sort. Within the burden-of-proof jurisprudence, 
one respected canon is that the burden shall be placed on the party who has 
control of or access to the relevant information; that is the canon upon which 
Barker properly relies. But another respectable canon is that the burden-of-
proof should not be placed so as to require a party to prove a negative. This 
canon the Barker rule violates. 
Id. at 468; see also Henderson, Defective Product Design, supra note 9, at 784-85: "Di-
rected verdicts for defendants, traditionally an important protection against arbitrary 
jury decisions in cases of doubtful merit, will occur even less frequently under the Barker 
[burden-of-proof] rule literally applied than they occur under the existing majority rule." 
The need to control product design litigation by directed verdict practice is discussed 
in Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect 
Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
521 (1982). 
26. See Schwartz, supra note 19. Professor Schwartz, in discussing cases where the 
victim has suffered severe injuries but the facts supporting design defects are weak, 
states: 
Given the frailty of the liability claim, without Barker the plaintiff might well 
succumb to summary judgment or a directed verdict. Under Barker, however, 
once the burden of proof has been shifted by the plaintiff's limited showing, only 
in a few cases will the manufacturer be able to offer the kind of unmistakable 
evidence that overcomes the defect presumption as a matter of law. 
Id. at 470; see Twerski, National Product Liability Legislation: In Search of the Best of 
All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 411, 412 (1982). 
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B. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.-The Assault on Market 
Decision Making 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has led the nation in pushing 
back the frontiers of product liability law.27 Commentators have 
questioned the wisdom of these changes, particularly the holding 
in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.28 which imposed 
strict liability on the defendant for failing to warn of dangers 
that were technologically and scientifically unknowable at the 
time the product was sold.29 Similarly, manufacturers point to 
Beshada as irrefutable evidence that common law courts have 
lost touch with reality.30 Prior to Beshada several decisions con-
tained language indicating that a manufacturer would be 
27. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984) (finding 
manufacturers of prescription drugs not immune to strict liability; deeming reasonably 
prudent manufacturer to know of information generally available or reasonably obtaina-
ble at time of distribution; and holding that defendant bears burden in strict liability 
failure-to-warn cases of proving that information was not reasonably obtainable at time 
of distribution); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983) (holding 
state-of-the-art evidence relevant to risk-utility analysis and therefore admissible in 
strict liability cases involving design defects, but plaintiff is not required to prove an 
alternative design to make out prima facie case); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. 
Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (disallowing state-of-the-art defense in failure-to-
warn cases); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979) 
(rejecting assumption of risk industrial design cases); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 
402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972) (rejecting contributory negligence in industrial design cases); 
Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (finding liability in sales-
service hybrid transactions); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental, 45 N.J. 434, 212 
A.2d 769 (1965) (holding lessor strictly liable); Santor v. A & R Karagheusian, Inc., 44 
N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (granting recovery in strict liability for economic loss); Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (invalidating dis-
claimer of warranty where contract of adhesion present). 
28. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). 
29. See Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment K and for Strict 
Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 877-82 (1983); Schwartz, New Products, Old Prod-
ucts, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV., 796, 824-25 (1983); Schwartz, 
The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable 
Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892, 901-05 (1983); Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability 
of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734 (1983); Comment, 
Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable Product 
Defects, 71 GEo. L.J. 1635 (1983); Birnbaum & Wrubel, N.J. High Court Blazes New 
Path in Holding a Manufacturer Liable, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 24, col. 1; see also 
Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 189 N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d 203 (1983) (limiting 
Beshada rule to "ordinary" products cases; New Jersey law does not require the imputa-
tion of time-of-trial knowledge in failure-to-warn cases attending the use of pharmaceu-
tical drugs). But see Placitella & Darnell, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.: 
Evolution or Revolution in Strict Products Liability?, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 801 (1983). 
30. See, e.g., S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 91 (statement of James Sales) 
("Under Beshada of New Jersey and Azarello of Pennsylvania, it matters not that a 1940 
automobile, if it is the subject of a lawsuit today, will be judged by the standards of 
engineering knowledge available in 1983. To me that is absurd."). 
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charged with knowledge of risk whether or not reasonable con-
duct on its part would have revealed the information.31 Never-
theless, not even these pre-Beshada cases maintained that liabil-
ity would attach for failing to provide warnings based on 
scientific or technological information that was unavailable at 
the time the defendant marketed the product. · 
In O'Brien v. Muskin Corp. 32 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
strengthened the position of the proponents of legislative reform 
by permitting the jury to decide that a rather ordinary product 
could be declared defective even though the plaintiff presented 
no evidence of the feasibility of an alternative design that would 
have minimized the risk. O'Brien. involved an outdoor, above-
ground swimming pool made out of an embossed vinyl liner 
which fit within an outer structure and was filled with water to a 
depth of approximately three and one-half feet. On the outer 
wall of the pool, the manufacturer placed a decal that warned 
"DO NOT DIVE" in letters roughly one-half inch high. Despite 
the warning, the plaintiff, a twenty-three year old, dove into the 
pool. As his outstretched hands hit the vinyl-lined bottom, they 
slid apart, and he struck his head on the bottom of the pool, 
sustaining serious injuries. The complaint alleged that the man-
ufacturer was strictly liable for failing to warn adequately about 
the dangers of diving and for using the highly slippery vinyl . 
liner. 
The trial judge permitted the jury to determine the adequacy 
of the warning. Yet, the judge took the design defect issue from 
the jury because the plaintiff's expert admitted that he knew of 
no above-ground pool that made use of any material other than 
vinyl as a liner, even though the expert criticized the use of 
vinyl. Thus, the court found the absence of testimony as to a 
viable alternative sufficient grounds to remove the design issue 
from the case. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed. In sending the case 
back for retrial on the design defect allegation, the court noted 
that: 
The evaluation of the utility of a product also involves 
31. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. 
Rptr. 225, 239 (1978); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, 87 N.J. 229, 239, 432 A.2d 925, 930 
(1981); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 163, 386 A.2d 816, 821 (1978), 
overruled on other grounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 177, 
406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 494-95, 525 P.2d 
1033, 1037-38 (1974). 
32. 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983). 
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the relative need for that product; some products are es-
sentials, while others are luxuries. A product that fills a 
critical need and can be designed in only one way should 
be viewed differently from a luxury item. Still other 
products, including some for which no alternative exists, 
are so dangerous and of such little use that under the 
risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer would bear the cost 
of liability of harm to others. That cost might dissuade a 
manufacturer from placing the product on the market, 
even if the product has been made as safely as possible. 
Indeed, plaintiff contends that above-ground pools with 
vinyl liners are such products and that manufacturers 
who market those pools should bear the cost of injuries 
they cause to foreseeable users. 33 
Thus, the court concluded that a case for design defect could go 
to the jury even where the plaintiff failed to prove the existence 
of alternative safer designs. It maintained that "[e]ven if there 
are no alternative methods of making bottoms for above-ground 
pools, the jury might have found that the risk posed by the pool 
outweighed its utility."34 
O'Brien reaches an astounding result. I do not quarrel with 
the court's contention that some products may present dangers 
so extreme that manufacturers should remove them from the 
market even if there exist no alternative designs that would re-
duce their dangerousness.35 Instead, the application of that prin-
ciple to the facts of O'Brien troubles me. O'Brien involved an 
above-ground swimming pool, a product that enjoys immense 
popularity throughout the country. Although the plaintiff con-
tended that the manufacturer failed adequately to warn about 
the risks of diving into the pool, the court submitted the design 
defect question to the jury as well. Because the design and warn-
ing claims can stand independent of each other, one must con-
clude that, even if the manufacturer had provided adequate 
warnings, the design defect allegation would stand. In short, 
courts may rely on O'Brien to declare defective in design a prod-
uct used in millions of American homes even though the manu-
facturer provides adequate warning of the risks involved in its 
misuse and the plaintiff fails to present any evidence of an alter-
native design that would render the product safer. 
33. Id. at 184, 463 A.2d at 306. 
34. Id. at 185, 463 A.2d at 306. 
35. See id. at 184, 463 A.2d at 306. 
SPRING 1985] Model Product Liability Bill 589 
Although the court admitted that imposing upon the manu-
facturer the cost of compensation for injuries might well lead it 
to remove the product from the market,36 the court still saw no 
reason to remove decision-making power from the jury. If courts 
abandon responsibility for rule making and permit cases as far-
fetched as O'Brien to go to juries, then one can only expect the 
business community to reject the common law as an acceptable 
decision-making process in product liability cases. Ultimately, 
O'Brien rejects the notion that the market, as an indicator of 
consumer values, provides an appropriate basis for concluding 
that widespread acceptance of a product indicates the social im-
portance of a product or society's willingness to accept the risk 
the product presents, or both. 37 
Moreover, in a design defect case, the plaintiff challenges an 
entire product line. Consequently, the defendant could face 
countless lawsuits without any realistic defense. This presents a 
frightening liability picture for even the most conscientious 
manufacturer. Because O'Brien permits a jury to condemn at 
whim a common product that a manufacturer has honestly mar-
keted and whose design it cannot improve, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court has added to the crisis of comprehensibility that 
stems from a lack of standards. Manufacturers cannot intelli-
gently respond to the dictates of O'Brien, and courts cannot 
guide juries to fair results utilizing its teaching. 
C. Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.-Confusion 
Compounded 
The application of strict liability principles to design defect 
and failure-to-warn cases has caused great confusion almost 
from the outset. 38 Unlike production defect cases, for which the 
manufacturer's "good" product provides the standard against 
36. See id. 
37. For an economic analysis of O'Brien, see Note, Strict Products Liability and the 
Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 2045 
(1984). In it the author points out that the O'Brien court has rejected the assumption of 
fully informed and rational consumers. Rejecting this assumption allows the court to 
reach the conclusion that consumers are buying more of the product than they would if 
they fully understood the product's risks. On a theoretical level the Note's author agrees 
with the O'Brien court's theory of court-enforced safety despite market demand. On a 
practical level, however, the Note's author predicts that few products on the market have 
negative net utility and that the O'Brien holding will give to juries many cases that they 
will probably decide incorrectly due to the emotional appeal of plaintiff's severe injuries. 
38. See Wade, supra note 29, at 741-45. 
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which to measure defect,39 the design and failure-to-warn cases 
require courts to create their own standard.40 By common ac-
knowledgement, risk-utility balancing became the test utilized 
to determine the availability of an alternative design that would 
not render the product "unreasonably. dangerous."41 
39. Henderson, Conscious Design Choices, supra note 9, at 1544; Phillips, A Synopsis 
of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 317, 345 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Phillips, Synopsis of the Developing Law]. See Phillips, The Standard for 
Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. C1N. L. REV. 101, 105 & n.22 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Phillips, Determining Defectiveness]. Section 104(A) of 
MUPLA, supra note 2, has incorporated the standard that measures a production defect 
against the manufacturer's internal design specifications. This standard is replete in the 
case law. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 
Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643, 655-56, 641 P.2d 353, 
362 (1982); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 491, 525 P.2d 1033, 1035-36 
(1974). 
40. Henderson, Conscious Design Choices, supra note 9, at 1547. 
41. Most of the recent literature in products liability has focused on the reasonable-
ness test and the appropriateness of risk-utility balancing as a method for establishing 
defects. See Birnbaum, supra note 9; Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the 
Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV. 643 (1978); Henderson, Conscious Design Choices, supra 
note 9; Henderson, Defective Product Design, supra note 9; Henderson, Expanding the 
Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept]; Henderson, Manufacturer's 
Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REV. 
625 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, Proposed Statutory Reform]; Hoenig, Prod-
uct Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 109 
(1976); Keeton, Products. Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 
CuM. L. REv. 293 (1979); Phillips, Determining Defectiveness, supra note 39; Schwartz, 
supra note 19; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings 
in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Use and Abuse of 
Warnings]; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products 
Liability: From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 347 (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives]; Wade, supra 
note 9. 
Most courts have adopted risk-utility analysis as either an exclusive or an alternative 
ground of liability. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-
73 (4th Cir. 1974) (exclusive ground); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 
(Alaska 1979) (alternative ground); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 
P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-39 (1978) (alternative ground); Lewis v. Bucy-
rus-Erie, Inc.,.622 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (exclusive ground); Michalko v. Cooke 
Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 394, 451 A.2d 179, 183 (1982) (exclusive ground); 
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 170-71, 406 A.2d 140, 150-51 
(1979) (alternative ground); Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 266-67, 461 N.E.2d 864, 866, 
473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (1984) (exclusive ground); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 
N.Y.2d 102, 108-09, 450 N.E.2d 204, 208-09, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402-03 (1983) (exclusive 
grounds); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78, 384 
N.Y.S.2d ll5, 121 (1976) (exclusive ground); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 
67-68, 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1978) (exclusive ground); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 
584 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex. 1979) (exclusive ground); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. 
Co., 162 W. Va. 857, 887-90, 253 S.E.2d 666, 682-83 (1979) (exclusive ground). Federal 
statutes also use the reasonableness concept in setting design standards. See, e.g., Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(0 (1982); Consumer Prod-
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Once courts focused on a risk-utility assessment, the question 
arose whether strict liability perceptibly differed from negli-
gence. The difference between the two is the time _when informa-
tion became available to the manufacturer or seller. Negligence, 
with its focus on the conduct of the manufacturer, would impose 
liability where a reasonable manufacturer knew or should have 
known of certain information.42 Strict liability, however, would 
impose liability even though a reasonable manufacturer would 
not have had access to information that later became available.43 
Thus, courts applying a strict liability standard would deem a 
product "unreasonably dangerous" even though the manufac-. 
turer had acted reasonably in designing and marketing the 
product. 
This attribution to the manufacturer of knowledge that it 
could not have acquired using reasonable care has created enor-
mous apprehension in the business community."" Courts and leg-
islatures have responded to this concern by creating "state of 
the art" defenses to the strict liability rule. •11 Although the for-
uct Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056(a), 2058(c) (1982). 
42. A number of courts have predicated liability in design defect and failure-to-warn 
cases on basic negligence principles. See, e.g., Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971); 
Schwartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 378 N.E.2d 61 (1978); Micallef v. 
Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376,348 N.E.2d 571,384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); Kennedy v. Custom 
Ice Equip. Co., 271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 176 (1978); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 
514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974). 
43. Although many courts have indicated that the strict liability standard governs 
design defect and failure-to-warn cases, a majority of them view strict liability in foresee-
ability terms. Using a "strict liability" standard, the following courts have predicated 
liability on the failure to utilize risk information or technology only if this knowledge was 
available at the time of sale. See, e.g., Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192 
(4th Cir. 1982); Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059, 1063-64 
(Alaska 1979); Woodhill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980); Hunt 
v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585, 589 (La. 1980); Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 270-
71, 461 N.E.2d 864, 868-69, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 382 (1984); Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 92 
Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979). Other courts reject the knowledge at the time-of-sale 
standard as being indistinguishable from negligence; they adopt a more absolute view of 
strict liability. At this end of the spectrum, the defendant is held liable for after-ac-
quired knowledge, even though he may have acted reasonably when he designed the 
product without regard to the availability of critical information or technology. See, e.g., 
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. 
225, 239-40 (1978); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. ·Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204-09, 447 
A.2d 539, 546-49 (1982); Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 395, 451 
A.2d 179, 183 (1982); Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 398-400, 564 
P.2d 674,676 (1977); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 497-98, 525 P.2d 1033, 
1039 (1974); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977). 
44. 4 REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY-LEGAL STUDY 
101 (1977). 
45. See, e.g., Sturm Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1979) ("While 
not, strictly speaking, a defense in a products liability action, state of the art may be 
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mulation of these "state of the art" rules differs from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction,46 in the end and for all practical purposes, 
the defense reinstates the negligence standard as the operative 
rule in all cases where it applies. 
The term "state of the art" came to mean all things to all peo-
ple.'17 Some courts used it to describe various kinds of knowl-
edge48 while others applied it to the different standards for im-
considered in determining whether a product is defective."); Bell Bonfil Memorial Blood 
Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 126 n.14 (Colo. 1983) ("When the [RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS (1965) § 402 A] comment k exception is asserted, establishing that the 
product's manufacture, design, and warning conformed to the state of the art is merely a 
part of the defendant's burden."); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 183, 463 A.2d 
298, 305 U983) ("Although state-of-the-art evidence may be dispositive on the facts of a 
particular case, it does not constitute an absolute defense apart from risk-utility analy-
sis."). The following statutes have been enacted: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (Supp. 
1980); Cow. REv. STAT. § 13-21-403(a) (Supp. 1984); IND. CooE § 33-1-1.5-4(b)(4)(1983); 
Kv. REV. STAT. § 411.310(2) (Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 182 (1979); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 29-28-105(b) (1980); WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 7.72.050(1) (Supp. 1985). 
46. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 7.72.050(1) (Supp. 1985) (allowing considera-
tion of evidence of industry custom, technological feasibility, or compliance with non-
governmental or legislative regulatory standards by trier of fact) with Kv. REv. STAT. § 
411.310(2) (Supp. 1984) (authorizing presumption of no defect upon proof of manufac-
turer's adherence to state of the art in design, manufacturing methods, and testing ) and 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (1982) (authorizing affirmative defense upon proof that 
product plans, manufacturing methods, inspection, testing, and labelling conformed with 
state of the art). 
47. Dean Wade urges that the "chameleon-like" term should be dropped from use 
because "its meanings are so diverse and so often confused." Wade, supra note 29, at 
751. Although most jurisdictions have misapplied "state of the art," if properly defined it 
has great utility. In response to the need for increased judicial control of design defect 
litigation, I proposed a multifactor duty analysis to replace single factor no-duty rules. 
See Twerski, supra note 25. While the single-issue test served to insulate the defendant 
manufacturer, an overall duty consideration that focuses on tangible policy factors aids 
the court in directing verdicts in cases that should not go to a jury. As one factor in this 
overall duty analysis, "state of the art" represents a useful screening device. Thus, in 
cases where substantial time has passed from manufacture to injury, courts should be 
sensitive to: (a) change in societal values, (b) the quality of expert testimony, and (c) the 
advanced state of knowledge and technology. These considerations should weigh on the 
decision to direct a verdict for the manufacturer. Id. at 556-61. 
48. Courts and commentators have used "state of the art" to describe at least three 
different kinds of problems. In the controversy over the fairness and wisdom of applying 
strict liability in design defect and failure-to-warn cases, "state of the art" refers to the 
limited knowledge of risk and technology available at the time the manufacturer first 
made the product or placed it into the stream of commerce. By asserting this defense, a 
manufacturer may limit the imputation of after-acquired knowledge and time-of-trial 
technological advances. Those who applaud this limitation claim that it is unjust to ap-
ply a risk-utility analysis with the benefit of hindsight. See Stonehocker v. General ·Mo-
tors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 156-157 (4th Cir. 1978); Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 
1176, 1184-86 n.24 (5th Cir. 1971). On the other hand, plaintiffs argue that it is virtually 
impossible to ascertain the exact state _of a defendant's knowledge of risk and technology 
and that the "state of the art" as described forces them to pinpoint knowledge and fore-
seeability with unfair exactitude. See Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 
809, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1974); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 
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plementing knowledge"0 in order to improve a product. In a 
masterful treatment of the subject, Dean Wade identified three 
separate kinds of knowledge that could be relevant to risk-utility 
balancing: (1) knowledge of dang_er, hazards, or risks that arise 
from normal use of a product that a manufacturer could have 
learned of after marketing the product; (2) scientific and techno-
logical developments that have occurred since marketing that 
could make the product safer; and (3) product use and misuse 
that a manufacturer could not have reasonably foreseen at the 
time of marketing but that the actual experience of consumer 
use has made available.110 
Dean Wade notes that courts differ sharply about whether 
they should impute knowledge of dangers arising from normal 
use to the defendant.111 As to the issue of technological and eco-
nomic feasibility, the issue most often dubbed "state of the art," 
most courts appear unwilling to impute post-marketing knowl-
edge. Dean Wade notes that "while product hazards exist inde-
pendently of whether anyone knows about them, feasibility is, 
almost by definition, a function of contemporary perceptions 
A.2d 140 (1979). See generally Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Prod-
ucts Liability, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1981); O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State 
of the Art: Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REv. 627 (1978); Twerski, 
supra note 25, at 556-61. For additional constructions of "state of the art" see infra note 
49. 
49. Courts use "state of the art" terminology to describe the complex interplay be-
tween design alternatives and the burden of proof in design litigation. How practically 
feasible must the plaintiff show his design alternative to be? The plaintiff's expert will 
ordinarily support the plaintiff's theory that the manufacturer could have designed the 
product in a way that minimized risk without destroying utility. The courts, however, 
divide on how much attention the plaintiff needs to give state-of-the-art issues. Manu-
facturers urge that the plaintiff must address in the prima facie case the practicality, 
cost, and marketability of the alternative he offers. See O'Donnell, supra note 48, at 646-
53. For an in-depth analysis of the role of experts in products liability litigation, see 
Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products Liability 
Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1303 (1974). 
Manufacturers also claim "state of the art" when issues of changing societal standards 
and increased consumer expectations are evident. Applied in this context, the "state of 
the art" bears a strong resemblance to a custom defense. In both cases, defendants point 
to socially accepted industry practices in an effort to justify its design. Defendants argue, 
with varied success, that courts cannot require industry to set standards that do not 
correspond with society's needs and attitudes. Thus, even when plaintiffs present an eco-
nomically and technologically feasible alternative design that is demonstrably safer, de-
fendants argue that liability should not attach because at the relevant time of manufac-
ture or distribution, society did not demand the proposed level of safety. See Wade, 
supra note 29, at 750 & n.59. Once again, courts should determine issues of changing 
societal norms, as well as the aforementioned knowledge of risk and technology and 
shifting burdens of proof. See Twerski, supra note 25, at 556-61 for discussion and addi-
tional sources. 
50. Wade, supra note 29, at 751-53. 
51. Id. at 757. 
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and priorities."52 Nonetheless, he finds no justification for dis-
tinguishing between the various kinds of knowledge.53 An exami-
nation of Carter u. Johns-Manville Corp. 54 serves to illustrate 
the logical inconsistencies these meaningless distinctions create. 
In Carter, plaintiff's decedent (Elbert Blackwell) brought suit 
against Johns-Manville, the manufacturer of the asbestos used 
as insulation material in a shipyard where he worked from 1942 
to 1946. The use of defendant's product exposed Blackwell to 
fiber dust from which he contracted a fatal case of mesothe-
lioma. The plaintiff brought suit on both failure-to-warn and de-
sign defect grounds and, for the purpose of perfecting an appeal, 
the parties stipulated "that the defendant did not know of the 
dangers involved in using its products, nor could it have reason-
ably known of them or foreseen them, even held to the knowl-
edge and skill of an expert. "55 
The Texas District Court found that, under state law, it could 
impute after-acquired knowledge in a defective design case but 
not in a failure-to-warn case.56 The court found that Texas 
adopted strict liability in design defect litigation.57 It reasoned 
that if strict liability did not require the imputation of after-
acquired knowledge, there would be no difference between negli-
gence and strict liability.58 
The court then examined Texas law on the issue of failure to 
warn. Here, the court found that Texas had retained a basic 
negligence rule. 59 One might attribute this result to the Texas 
court's uneasiness about imposing a duty on the manufacturer to 
warn about information that it could not reasonably obtain. The 
matter did not, however, end at this point. Having concluded 
that the plaintiff could not pursue the failure-to-warn claim 
52. Id. at 757-58. 
53. Id. at 757-59. 
54. 557 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Tex. 1983). 
55. Id. at 1318. 
56. Id. at 1319. 
57. Id. at 1318-19. 
58. The court noted that: 
[T]he "prudent manufacturer" test used in strict liability cases already incorpo-
rates the "reasonable man" test used in negligence cases. The difference is that 
in a strict liability case, the defendant's awareness of the danger is hypothe-
sized, and therefore the plaintiff need not prove that the danger was foresee-
able. To permit the defendant to defeat a strict liability claim by proving that it 
could not have foreseen the danger, in effect by proving that it was not negli-
gent, would fly in the face of the entire history of the evolution of strict liability 
in tort. 
Id. at 1319 (emphasis added). 
59. Id. 
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under strict liability, the court returned to con_sider the design 
defect claim. It observed that in order to perform a risk-utility 
analysis, a court must investigate not only engineering changes 
that could have rendered the product safer but also whether a 
warning could have helped to reduce the product's 
dangerousness. 
In essence, the court viewed a warning as "one of a product's 
many design attributes that weigh in the balance of dangers 
against utility to determine whether the product is unreasonably 
dangerous."6° Consequently, it found that "[a] manufacturer 
. . . [ could] defend a strict liability claim based on defective de-
sign by showing that a warning accompanied the product that 
reduced its dangers."61 The court, however, explicitly rejected 
the notion that a manufacturer could introduce hypothetical 
warnings that might have made the product safer and then ex-
cuse the failure to provide these warnings on its justifiable igno-
rance of the risk information. To permit this, the court main-
tained, would "reinject the element of foreseeability into the 
theory of strict liability for defective design, and revert that the-
ory into one of negligence. "62 
Finally, the court turned its attention to the "state of the art" 
question. A leading Texas case, Bailey v. Boatland of Houston,63 
had firmly established "state of the art" as a legitimate defense 
to a strict liability design defect claim. The Carter court ex-
plained that this state-of-the-art defense would permit the de-
fendant to argue that the unavailability of technology or the eco-
nomic infeasibility of implementing an alternate design 
precluded it from making its original design safer.6 ' Neverthe-
less, under the state-of-the-art defense, a manufacturer defend-
ing in a failure-to-warn case could not argue that it provided no 
warning because it had not known of the danger against which 
the consumer should have taken precaution. Instead, the court 
maintained that: 
[t]he manufacturer would have to claim that, even if the 
danger was in fact foreseeable, it was not feasible to 
have included a warning on the product, in that there 
did not exist the technological capability to have done 
so, at least not without making the product less useful 
60. Id. at 1320. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). 
64. 557 F. Supp. at 1320. 
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to society. Foreseeability is know-of; true state of the art 
is know-how. Know-of has no place in a strict liability 
case based on defective design.65 
We have now come full circle. To succeed under a state-of-
the-art defense a defendant need only establish that it incorpo-
rated into its product all technologically and economically feasi-
ble safety measures. Consequently, a manufacturer must supply 
a warning only when feasible.66 The feasibility of a warning, 
however, depends on knowledge of the risk against which the 
warning seeks to advise the user, and in a design defect case the 
court cannot inquire into knowledge of the risk or foreseeability 
of the harm. Thus, the court is caught in a classic Catch-22 from 
which it cannot extricate itself. 
One can argue that the court's dilemma stemmed from the 
Texas courts' failure to apply strict liability in both design and 
failure-to-warn cases. With very few exceptions,67 however, 
courts have strongly resisted applying strict liability in the pure 
failure-to-warn case.68 If Texas erred here, then so have all the 
other courts that have refused to follow Beshada. 
Some commentators have taken the position that Carter erred 
in treating the warning issue as negligence when the claim was 
failure to warn and as strict liability when the claim was based 
65. Id. at 1320-21 (emphasis added). 
66. Id. at 1320. 
67. The following courts have applied strict liability in a failure-to-warn case or have 
approved of its application in dicta: Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 246-47 
(3d Cir. 1984) (applying New Jersey law); Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 
F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying Montana law); Hamilton & Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 
375, 384-85, 549 P.2d 1099, 1107 (1976); Beshada v. Johns-Manville, 90 N.J. 191, 204-05, 
447 A.2d 539, 546-47 (1982); Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 402, 
451 A.2d 179, 187 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 240, 432 A.2d 
925,931 (1981); Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 258 Pa. Super. 59, 78,391 A.2d 1074, 1083 
(1978); Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812, 820-22, 579 P.2d 940, 945-97 (1978), 
modified, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979). 
68. The following decisions reflect the majority view. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 344 (5th Cir. 1982) (asbestos insulation); Karjala v. 
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158-59 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying Minnesota 
law) (asbestos insulation); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1090 
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (asbestos insulation ); Cover v. Cohen, 
61 N.Y.2d 261, 274-75, 461 N.E.2d 864,871,473 N.Y.S.2d 378,385 (1984) (throttle return 
spring in automobile); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 198, 423 N.E.2d 
831, 836-37 (1981) (oral contraceptives); Bristol-Meyers v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 
(Tex. 1978) (ototoxic pharmaceutical drugs). It is worth noting that the duty to warn is 
an ongoing process that does not terminate upon manufacture and delivery. Many courts 
apply a negligence standard to defective warning in the first instance and continue to 
impose a duty on manufacturers to update their warnings and notify retailers and con-
sumers of dangers that become known after distribution. 
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on design defect.69 They argue that courts should treat a failure-
to-warn claim as based in negligence and ought not to impute 
after-acquired knowledge merely because the warning issue is 
made part of the design defect claim. 70 Although this contention 
has merit, the authors fail to recognize the soundness of the 
court's analysis. One cannot evaluate a product's design by sim-
ply inquiring into the proposed design changes that a manufac-
turer could have made. 
Warnings play a legitimate role in risk-utility analysis.71 
Sometimes a warning alone will reduce the probability of the 
harm sufficiently to render an otherwise dangerous product rea-
sonably safe. In other instances, a manufacturer will have to 
combine design changes and warnings to achieve reasonable 
safety. There is just no way to artificially distinguish between 
·69. See Wheeler & Kress, A Comment on Recent Developments in Judicial Imputa-
tion of Post-Manufacture Knowledge in Strict Liability Cases, 6 J. PROD. LIAB. 127, 128-
36 (1983); cf. Wade, supra note 29, at nn.50-52 and accompanying text. 
70. Wheeler and Kress argue that Carter introduces imputed knowledge into the fail-
ure-to-warn claim without sound justification. Wheeler & Kress, supra note 69, at 145. 
The authors contend that there are good reasons for refusing to impute time-of-trial 
knowledge when the "defect" is a failure to warn and criticize Carter for its superficial 
analysis. Id. at 144-45. 
Carter creates an initial problem by affording the plaintiff a unique advantage when 
the court imputes knowledge to the defendant in the failure-to-warn case. Unlike design 
modifications in which the prohibitive costs may offset the benefit of a safer alternative, 
warnings cost little and generally do not impede the product's function. Almost any risk 
reduction attributable to a warning will therefore make the warning cost effective on 
risk-utility balancing. Once the court removes the foreseeability question, liability will be 
greatly extended. The effect of strict liability on the food and chemical industries is es-
pecially troubling. While it is very difficult to change the chemical structure without 
seriously impairing the function of food, pharmaceuticals and other chemicals, courts can 
apply post-manufacture knowledge of risk to a written warning with relative ease. Id. at 
137-39. 
Moreover, strict liability in failure-to-warn will have a disproportionate impact be-
cause generally there exists a greater likelihood of discovery of post-manufacture risks 
for chemical and food products than for machines. Id. at 141-42. The authors attribute 
this to naturally longer discovery periods between exposure to the product and manifes-
tation of injury, the accelerating growth of knowledge in the field of biochemistry as 
compared to well-understood engineering principles; and the relative difficulty of post-
sale warning and recall in the food and chemical industries. Id. at 142-43. 
71. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra 
note 41, at 517: 
In short, when calculating the burden of precaution which is part of the risk-
utility calculus, it will be necessary to focus on costs other than the cost of label 
printing. The efficacy of warning is a societal cost of substantial importance. 
Thus, it will not be possible for the courts to rely on warnings alone to ensure 
product safety. The range of risks is so broad, and the type of consumer re-
sponse so varied, that the courts cannot avoid asking "what is a reasonably safe 
product" or "how much safety is enough." The answers will sometimes lie with 
an adequate warning, sometimes with redesign of the product, but most often 
with warning and design blended together to give an adequate level of safety. 
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warning and design parameters. A design change in and of itself 
may accomplish greater safety by making it more difficult for 
the dangerous event to take place and by simultaneously high-
lighting the dangerous nature of the product, thus calling the 
user's attention to whatever product danger remains. Thus a sin-
gle design change may serve both engineering safety and com-
municating danger functions. A tamper-proof cap on a bottle 
containing poisonous ingredients serves both to deter easy access 
by children (engineering safety) and to alert the user that the 
contents are dangerous (communicating danger). 
In short, warning and design claims overlap, To utilize a strict 
liability standard for the design aspect of the design defect claim 
and a negligence standard for the warning aspect of the same 
design defect claim is ludicrous, because both aspects will pre-
sent the same after-acquired knowledge issue. Thus, there is 
simply no intellectually honest way to split them asunder. 
Again manufacturers confront distinctions that lack compre-
hensibility. They are legitimately confused as to just what the 
law demands of them. At the adjudicative level, courts have sad-
dled themselves with inconsistent doctrine. Translating this doc-
trine into jury instructions seriously compounds the problem. 
One can only imagine how jurors would react to an instruction 
based on the Carter opinion. The instruction would probably 
read as follows: 72 
The plaintiff alleges that the asbestos supplied by the 
defendant was defectively designed. In deciding whether 
the asbestos was reasonably safe for use you are to con-
sider that the supplier had knowledge of the dangers at-
tendant to the use of asbestos even though at the time of 
manufacture it was not reasonably foreseeable that such 
danger existed. 
The supplier's liability does not rest upon what he 
knew or should have known when he manufactured or 
sold the product; it rests on his placing into the stream of 
commerce a product which is determined at trial to have 
been dangerous. The damaging event may not have been 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the manufacture or 
sale because the dangerous factor of the product might 
not then have been even reasonably knowable. The sup-
plier would thus be free of culpability, but a price of his 
72. This instruction is the author's. The second paragraph comes from Carter, see 
infra note 73. 
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doing business is to protect people from danger from his 
product-or to pay.73 
The defendant claims that his product met the state of 
the art at the time the product was manufactured and 
distributed for sale. If you find that the product met the 
standards of technology existing from 1942-1946 or that 
to have altered the design would not have been economi-
cally feasible, then the defendant is not liable. However, 
if a warning was technologically possible and economi-
cally feasible in the years 1942-1946, then defendant is 
liable whether or not it was able to foresee the dangers 
against which it was to warn. The fact that the danger 
was unforseeable does not prevent the manufacturer 
from being held liable. Technological and economic feasi-
bility if relevant go only to the ability to warn against 
danger, not whether the defendant was aware of the 
danger. 
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The proposed instruction would probably not only confuse a 
jury but would also call into question the sanity of a court that 
ordered the jury to decide an actual dispute utilizing its guide-
lines. Something has to give. The law should either adopt true 
strict liability or negligence in both design and failure-to-warn 
cases. The present schizophrenia in the law must come to an 
end. 
D. A Rational Solution-Negligence for Design and Failure-
to-Warn Claims 
The time has come to make negligence the sole test for all 
product liability cases in· which the claim is defective design or 
failure to warn. As in other negligence cases, ,yet unlike the 
Barker strict liability, risk-utility approach, the burden of proof 
on the issue of negligence should remain with the plaintiff. In 
this regard, the goals of S. 44 and its predecessor bills74 were 
fully justified. The bills' faults occurred rather in the language 
they utilized to execute their intent. Instead of relying on classi-
cal language to give expression to the negligence concept, the 
bills created new language and definitions that would require 
73. This paragraph is cited in Carter, 557 F. Supp at 1319. It is taken from General 
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977). 
7 4. See supra note 2. 
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years of interpretation before courts would agree on their mean-
ings. 76 Furthermore, the drafters added section upon section to 
75. For the use of new language applicable to the liability standard, see, e.g., H.R. 
5626, supra note 2: 
SEC.5(a) In any product liability action based upon the formula or design of a 
product, the defendant shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, in addition to other facts required to be proved 
under State or Federal law (including other provisions of this Act)-
(1) that the formula or design of the product was the immediate, physi-
cal and producing cause of the injury or damage of which the plain-
tiff complains; and 
(2) that an alternative formula or design meeting the requirements of 
subsection (b) was-
(A) available at the time of manufacture; and 
(B) would have avoided or reduced the injury or damage ·of which 
the plaintiff complains. 
(b) A formula or design shall be considered to be an alternative for purposes 
of this section only if it-
(1) (A) Provides overall safety as good as, or better than, the overall 
safety of the formula or design of the product in question; and 
(B) provides better safety as to the particular hazard which alleg-
edly caused the injury or damage. 
H.R. 5214, supra note 2: 
SEC.5(a)(l) In any products liability action brought against a manufacturer for 
harm allegedly caused by a product, the manufacturer shall be liable to a 
claimant only if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence-
(A) that the product was unreasonably dangerous-
(ii) in design, under subsection (c), and that the manufac-
turer was negligent in selling the product in such 
condition; 
(iii) because the manufacturer failed to provide adequate 
warnings or instructions, under subsection (d), and that 
the manufacturer was negligent in failing to provide such 
information; or 
(B) that the unreasonably dangerous aspect of such product was 
the proximate cause of the harm complained of by the claim-
ant; and 
(C) that the particular product unit which allegedly harmed the 
claimant was manufactured by the defendant. 
(b) A product shall be considered unreasonably dangerous in construction 
only if it is determined that, when the product left the control of the 
manufacturer, the product deviated in a material way-
(1) from the design specifications or performance standards of the man-
ufacturer; or 
(2) from otherwise identical units of the same product line. 
(c)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (4), a product shall be considered un-
reasonably dangerous in design only if it is determined that the manufacturer 
failed to adopt an alternative design that-
(A) was available to the manufacturer when the product was 
designed, under paragraph (2); 
(B) was on balance better than the chosen design, under para-
graph (3); and 
(C) would have prevented the claimant's harm. 
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(2) An alternative design shall be considered available to the manufac-
turer when the product was designed if the alternative design was 
known at that time or in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
been known by the manufacturer to exist and to be feasible for use 
in the product by the manufacturer. 
(3) An alternative design shall be considered better than the manufac-
turer's design if the alternative design-
(A) was significantly safer than the chosen design. The alternative 
design was safer than the chosen design if the alternative de~ 
sign would have provided both-
(i) better safety than that of the chosen design as to the 
particular hazard which allegedly caused the claimant's 
harm; and 
(ii) better overall safety than that of the chosen design. The 
overall safety of the alternative design is better if the 
hazards it eliminates are greater than any new hazards it 
creates for any persons and for any uses; 
(B) was not more expensive than the chosen design, unless the 
added safety benefits of the alternative design were signifi-
cantly greater than the added expense; 
(C) was not less useful or desirable than the chosen design, unless 
the added safety benefits of the alternative design were signif-
icantly greater than the losses of usefulness or desirability; 
and 
(D) was not in violation of any statute, regulation, or mandatory 
safety standard of Federal or State government. 
(4) A product shall not be considered unreasonably dangerous in design 
where the claimant's harm resulted from-
(A) a manner of use of the j)roduct other than that which would 
be reasonably expected of an ordinary person who is likely to 
use the product; or 
(B) an alteration or modification of the product other than that 
which would be reasonably expected of an ordinary person 
who is likely to use the product. 
S. 44, supra note 2: 
SEC.4(a) In any product liability action, a manufacturer is liable to a claimant 
if-
(1) the claimant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that-
(B) the product was unreasonably dangerous in design or formula-
tion, as defined in section 5(b); 
SEC.5(b) A product is unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation if, at 
the earlier of the time of manufacture or Government certification of the prod-
uct, a reasonably prudent manufacturer in the same or similar circumstances 
would not have used the design or formulation that the manufacturer used. 
For new definitional standards, see, e.g., H.R. 5626, supra, note 2: 
SEC.3(6) The term "product" means any tangible article (including attach-
ments, accessories, and component parts of such articles) and the term "prod-
uct unit" means any single item or unit of a product. 
H.R. 5214, supra note 2: 
SEC.8(4) The term "product" means any object which is capable of delivery 
either as an assembled whole or as a component part and is produced for intro-
duction into trade or commerce. Such term does not include human tissue, 
organs, or human blood and its components. 
SEC. 8(7). The term "harm" means (A) damage to property other than the 
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qualify the negligence test and limit its application. 76 
product itself; (B) personal physical injuries, illness, or death; or (C) pain or 
mental harm resulting from such personal physical injuries, illness, or death. 
The term "harm" does not include commercial loss. 
SEC. 8(11). The term "feasible" means practicable within the technical and 
scientific knowledge which is available, adequately demonstrated, and econom-
ically feasible for use by a product seller at the time of manufacture of a 
product. 
S. 44, supra note 2: 
SEC. 2(5). "harm" means (A) physical damage to property other than _the 
product itself; (B) personal physical illness, injury, or death of the claimant; or 
(C) mental anguish or emotional harm of the claimant caused by the claimant's 
personal physical illness or injury; "harm" does not include commercial loss; 
SEC. 2(8). "practical technological feasibility" means the technical, medical, 
and scientific knowledge relating to the safety of a product which, at the time 
of production or manufacture of a product, was developed, available and capa-
ble of use in the manufacture of il product, and economically feasible for use 
by a manufacturer. 
76. H.R. 5626, supra note 2: 
SEC. 5(c). In any product liability action based upon the formula or design of 
a product, the defendant shall not be liable for that portion, including the 
whole, of the personal injury, death, or property damage complained of which 
could have been avoided or reduced by the attachment to, inclusion in, or use 
with the product of an additional safety or protective device or substance, if 
the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of 
manufacture-
(!) the product was suited to more than a single function or manner of 
use; 
(2) the attachmeiit, inclusion or use of such additional device or sub-
stance would have been inappropriate or incompatible with a func-
tion or manner of use to which the product was suited; 
(3) such additional device or substance was known or should have been 
known to be available for purchase or use by the person injured or 
damaged or by such person's employer; 
(4) the person injured or damaged or such person's employer did not 
purchase or use such additional device or substance; and 
(5) the use of such device or substance would have enabled the person 
injured or damaged to avoid or reduce the personal injury, death, or 
property damage of which the plaintiff complains. 
(d) In any product liability action based upon the formula or design of a 
product, the defendant shall not be liable if the defendant proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the product formula or design com-
plied with mandatory standards or regulations adopted by the Federal 
Government which were applicable to the product at the time of manu-
facture and which pertained directly to the hazard of which the plaintiff 
complains. 
H.R. 5214, supra note 2: 
SEC. 7(a). In any product liability action for harm allegedly caused by a 
product-
(!) if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
aspect of the product or its use of which the claimant complains 
failed to comply with applicable mandatory Federal or State gov-
ernment safety standards existing at the time of manufacture and 
pertaining directly to that aspect of the product or its use, the 
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My proposed legislation makes adoption of the negligence 
standard simple and straightforward. This adoption of a negli-
gence test would affect existing law in a number of ways. It 
would replace some of the concepts courts presently use and ef-
fectively overrule certain precedents. First, courts could no 
longer apply the consumer expectation test as the sole liability 
standard in a design defect or failure-to-warn case.77 Second, the 
claimant shall be deemed to have satisfied the proof requirements of 
section 5(a)(l)(A) or 6(a)(l)(A) with respect to such aspect of the 
product or its use unless the product seller proves by clear and con• 
vincing evidence that its failure to comply with such standards was 
a reasonably prudent course of conduct under the circumstances; 
and 
(2) if the product seller proves by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the aspect of the product or its use of which the claimant complains 
complied with applicable mandatory Federal or State government 
safety standards existing at the time of manufacture or thereafter 
and pertaining directly to that aspect of the product or its use, the 
claimant shall be deemed to have failed to satisfy the proof require-
ments of section 5(a)(l)(A) or 6(a)(l)(A) with respect to such aspect 
of the product or its use unless the claimant proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that such standards were unsound. 
S. 44, supra note 2: 
SEC. 5(b). A product is not unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation 
unless-
(1) the manufacturer knew or, based on knowledge which was reasona-
bly accepted in the scientific, technical, or medical community for 
the existence of the danger which caused the claimant's harm, 
should have known about the danger which allegedly caused the 
claimant's harm; and 
(2) a means to eliminate the danger that caused the harm was within 
practical technological feasibility. 
77. The following cases are illustrative of the diversity of jurisdictions that have ex-
pressed their liability standard in consumer expectation terms: Burce v. Martin-Marietta 
Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that plaintiff must show that the product 
was dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary consumer at the time of manufac-
ture); Vineyard v. Empire Mach. Co., 119 Ariz. 502, 505, 581 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1978) 
(finding that the alleged defect must make the product dangerous "to an extent beyond 
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer") (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) or TORTS § 402A comment (i) (1965)); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643, 
641 P.2d 353 (1982) (rejecting two-prong Barker test in favor of single test of consumer 
expectations); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456,467,424 N.E.2d 
568, 577 (1981) (holding that "product will be found unreasonably dangerous if it is dan-
gerous to an extent beyond the expectations of an ordinary consumer"; reciting to the 
first prong of the Barker test and comment (i)); see, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 
Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool 
Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975). In addition, a number of courts have 
adopted the two-prong Barker test discussed supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text, 
and these cases would also be overruled by the proposed legislation. See, e.g., Caterpillar 
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 
Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 
Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio 
St. 2d 460, 436 N.E.2d 814 (1982). 
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defendant would not carry the burden of proving that its prod-
uct was not defective. 7 8 The burden of proof for negligence 
would reside with the plaintiff. Third, the defendant would not 
be liable for information concerning dangers that it could not 
have reasonably foreseen at the time it distributed the product'9 
or for the implementation of design changes that were not eco-
nomically or technologically feasible at the time of distribution 
of the product.80 Rather, the plaintiff would have to establish 
the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff would be free to 
prove that at the time of product distribution the defendant ei-
ther knew or should have known about the danger or the design 
alternative that could have avoided a known danger. At the 
same time, all claims of negligence for post-distribution failure 
to warn or failure to recall would remain in place. Finally, a 
plaintiff could not admit evidence of post-distribution product 
modification in those jurisdictions that adhere to the subsequent 
repair rule in negligence cases. 81 Because the subsequent repair 
rule is almost universally accepted, it would ipso facto become 
the governing national rule in product liability design defect and 
78. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 
(1973), generated much debate on the relative benefits of burden shifting, see infra text 
accompanying note 91, and is generally criticized. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 
605-09; Henderson, Defective Product Design, supra note 9, at 782-97; Schwartz, supra 
note 19, at 464-71; Wade, supra note 9, at 573-75. Moreover, in the seven years since 
Barker was decided, only one state has seen fit to follow Calfornia's approach. See Cater-
pillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) (placing burden of proof on the 
defendant to establish that the benefits of the challenged design outweigh its inherent 
risk of danger). 
79. Although the majority of jurisdictions presently apply a negligence standard in 
the failure-to-warn case, the proposed statute would overrule a number of decisions. See 
supra notes 67-68. 
80. Applying a negligence test to the issue of technological and economic feasibility 
will probably change existing law significantly. As noted earlier, see supra notes 45-46, 
many states have specifically enacted "state of art statutes." Others have accomplished 
the same result by judicial decision. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 
A.2d 298 (1983); Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). Admit-
tedly, "state of the art" is sometimes formulated as a defense. See authorities cited 
supra notes 45-46. However, the posturing of risk-utility consideration as a defense is 
procedurally awkward. See discussion supra notes 25-26. Placing the burden of proof of 
the negligence issue on the plaintiff should simplify litigation considerably. 
81. See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 
Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975) (evidence of subsequent remedial measures admissible for any rele-
vant purpose in strict liability and inadmissible in negligence; court construing exclu-
sionary rule which had no exceptions); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 
3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251 (S.D. 1976) 
(admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability for any relevant 
purpose; case simply rubbersstamps Ault); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 648 P.2d 
519 (Wyo. 1982) (admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability 
for any relevant purpose; exclusionary purposes of Wvo. R. Evm. 407 applies only to 
cases of negligence). 
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failure-to-warn cases.82 
The proposed legislation will not, however, address production 
defect cases. Jurisdictions almost universally agree that strict li-
ability governs these cases.83 Following the good-sense rule that 
"If it ain't broke, don't fix it," there is no need to add defini-
tional problems and legislative verbiage that could constrict the 
ability of courts to act on product defect questions that have yet 
to surface. 84 
Despite my rejection of the consumer expectation test in this 
82. Soo Hoo & Soo Hoo, Evidence of Subsequent Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and 
Tomorrow, 9 U.C.D. L. REV. 421 (1976); Annot., 74 AL.R. 3d 1001, 1014-15 (1976); 29 AM. 
JuR. 2d Evidence § 275 (1967). 
83. See Phillips, Synopsis of the Developing Law, supra note 39, at 344-45; MUPLA 
§ 104(A), supra note 2. But see ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (Supp. 1980): 
In any product liability action, a defendant shall not be liable if the defendant 
proves that any of the following apply: 
1. The defect in the product is alleged to result from inadequate de-
sign or fabrication, and if the plans or designs for the product or the 
methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting, testing and 
labeling the product conformed with the state of the art at the time 
the product was first sold by the defendant; 
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1.5-4 (1983) (West Supp. 1985): 
(a) The defenses in this section are defenses to actions in strict liability in 
tort .... 
(b) With respect to any product liability action based on strict liability in 
tort: .... 
(4) When physical harm is caused by a defective product, it is a defense 
that the design, manufacture, inspection, packaging, warning, or la-
beling of the product was in conformity with the generally recog-
nized state of the art at the time the product.was designed, manu-
factured, packaged, and labeled. 
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.2945-.2946 (West Supp. 1983): 
Sec. 2945. As used in sections 2946 to 2949 and section 5805, "products liabil-
ity action" means an action based on any legal or equitable theory of liability 
brought for or on account of death or injury to person or property caused by or 
resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formula, development of 
standards,·preparation, processing, assembly, inspection, testing, listing, certi-
fying, warning, instructing, marketing, advertising, packaging, or labeling of a 
product or a component of a product. 
Sec. 2946. It shall be admissible as evidence in a products liability action that 
the manufacture, construction, design, formula, development of standards, 
preparation, processing, assembly, inspection, testing, listing, certifying, warn-
ing, instructing, marketing, advertising, packaging or labeling was done pursu-
ant to the generally recognized and prevailing nongovernmental standards in 
existence at the time the product was sold or delivered by the defendant to the 
initial purchaser or user. 
These statutes are troublesome because they appear to recognize the state-of-the-art de-
fense, and therefore negligence theory, in manufacturing defect cases. Nonetheless, I 
know of no decision refusing to apply strict liability in a production defect case. Thus, no 
need exists to legislate in an area where the courts are having no problems. 
84. For potential litigation problems that a statutory provision mandating strict lia-
bility in production defect cases would affect, see Twerski, supra note 26, at 419-21. 
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proposed statute, I will admit to some misgivings in abolishing 
it. In a lengthy article, I argued that with proper judicial over-
sight the consumer expectation test could fill a void in the law.811 
The consumer expectation test could address the problem of 
overzealous advertising that creates expectations yet falls below 
the threshold necessary to establish an action in express war-
ranty or misrepresentation. 86 . 
Nonetheless, I am now convinced that risk-utility balancing 
provides the only viable test for liability. Campbell v. General 
Motors Corp.87 gives evidence that courts will probably not place 
sensible limitations on the consumer expectation test. Indeed, 
once the courts have a common law liability standard in torts 
litigation, they have an inclination to automatically make the is-
sue one for the jury.88 Furthermore, as Professor Schwartz has 
noted, the negligent failure-to-warn claim covers a good bit of 
conduct that the consumer expectation test would cover.89 In 
this imperfect world, we must make choices. A simple and easily 
understood rule will ultimately bring about greater justice and 
fairness than a substantively superior one that trial judges and 
juries would probably mishandle. 
My proposal's placement of the burden of proof on the plain-
tiff runs counter to Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. 90 In that 
case, the court shifted the burden of proof on risk-utility to the 
defendant because the defendant was in a better position than 
the plaintiff to prove that the alternatives suggested by plaintiff 
were impractical or uneconomical. 91 Although this position has 
merit, the burden shifting makes it close to impossible for a de-
fendant to obtain a directed verdict in a frivolous case. The ad-
age that "he who bears the burden of proof never gets a directed 
verdict" is essentially accurate. No product liability system 
85. See Twerski, supra note 16. 
86. Id. at 897-901. 
87. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982). 
88. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEEToN, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 37 (5th ed. 1984). 
89. Professor Schwartz is generally critical of the Barker court's creation of an inde-
pendent consumer expectations prong. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 475-81. In his 
thesis, he questions the weight given to "affirmative" statements that fall short of mis-
representation and express warranty. Compare supra note 19. Schwartz further observes 
that in many cases a negligent failure-to-warn claim will subsume the consumer expecta-
tions test. As he explains, "negative" communications in the form of warnings about the 
product's dangers optionally serve to lower reasonable expectations about function and 
safety. Id. at 476. Therefore, in cases where an effective warning corrects misimpressions, 
or, in the alternative, where the fact finder is convinced that an appropriate warning 
would have served this function, no need exists for an independent consumer test. 
90. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). 
91. Id. at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. 
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should permit meritless cases to proceed to jury verdict. The 
only available judicial screening devices to prevent jury lawless-
ness are the motions for directed verdict or the motion notwith-
standing the verdict. These devices become a dead letter when 
the defendant bears the burden of proof. 
The issue of the imputation to the defendant of after-acquired 
knowledge has been blown well out of proportion. With state-of-
the-art defenses well in place in most jurisdictions, courts will 
not hold defendants liable for technological changes that they 
could not reasonably have attained at the time they distributed 
the product.92 Most of the courts that claim to apply strict lia-
bility for dangers or risks attendant to the use of a product are 
not prepared to impose liability for information that the defen-
dant could not have reasonably foreseen at the time of distribu-
tion.93 At best, the plaintiff may impute to the defendant infor-
mation available at the time of distribution without having to 
prove the defendant's negligence in failing to obtain that infor-
mation. Because, however, courts generally hold the defendant 
to the standard of an expert in the particular industry,94 if the 
information was available at the time of distribution, then the 
plaintiff should have little difficulty in convincing a jury that the 
defendant could have reasonably foreseen it. 
It is interesting to note that in the most heralded product lia-
bility cases of the decade, DES and asbestos, courts relied for 
the most part on negligence grounds. H In fact, in many of the 
92. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
93. Courts treat failure to warn as either an aspect of a product's design or as an 
independent basis of liability. When given the latter status, they read the "duty to warn" 
literally and generally do not expect the manufacturer to ~arn of unknown or unforesee-
able risks. See Wade, supra note 29, at 747 & n.52; see also cases cited in supra notes 67-
68. 
94. As Dean Prosser noted, when liability is predicated on negligence, the manufac-
turer is held to the standard of an expert in his field. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 96 
(4th ed. 1971); see, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 159 (8th 
Cir. 1975); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 Ill. App. 2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1968); Mc-
Daniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 203, 241 N.W.2d 822, 830 (1976); 
Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 452, 479 A.2d 374, 386 (1984); Seward v. 
Natural Gas Co., 11 N.J. Super. 144, 78 A.2d 129 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 8 N.J. 
45, 83 A.2d 716 (1951); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.4 (1956). 
95. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 
132 (DES), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Payton v. Abbott Laboratories., 386 Mass. 
540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982) (DES); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 
20 (DES), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 123 (1984); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 
436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982) (DES); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products 
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbestos), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Star-
ling v. Seaboard C.L. R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (asbestos); Aguilar v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., No. 400769 (San Diego Cty. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1981) (refusing to 
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asbestos cases plaintiffs recovered punitive damages, indicating 
that these plaintiffs established not only fault but grievous fault 
as well.96 Moreover, the same court that decided Beshada has 
unwittingly embraced the section 402A comment (k) 97 exception 
exempting drugs from strict liability.98 The use of after-acquired 
knowledge had potential for the greatest impact in the drug field 
because drugs tend to have a long latency period and side effects 
apply Sindell in an asbestos case) (order without opinion). 
96. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982) (up-
holding $500,000 award on appeal); Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (awarding $343,000 punitive damages against Johns-Manville and 
$95,000 punitive damages against Celotex, another asbestos manufacturer); Hansen v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., No. G-79-124 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ($1,000,000), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984) (allowing award of punitive damages but reducing 
amount to $300,000). 
97. See infra note 137 for the full text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A 
comment (k) (1965). 
98. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984). In Feldman 
the New Jersey Supreme Court opened its opinion by expressly rejecting the blanket 
application of the § 402A comment k unavoidably unsafe product exception to prescrip-
tion drugs. The court wrote that "drugs, like any other products, may contain defects 
that could have been avoided by better manufacturing or design. Whether a drug is un-
avoidably unsafe should be decided on a case-by-case basis .... " Id. at 447, 479 A.2d at 
383. The court further stated that comment k would not eliminate strict liability for 
failure to provide a proper warning even if a prescription drug were found to be unavoid-
ably unsafe. Id. 
Noting that Feldman involved a strict liability, failure-to-warn cause of action, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court next discussed the difference between the negligence and 
strict liability theories: 
This difference between strict liability and negligence is commonly expressed by 
stating that in a strict liability analysis, the defendant is assumed to know of the 
dangerous propensity of the product, whereas in a negligence case, the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant knew or should have known of the danger. 
Id. at 450, 479 A.2d at 385. The court stated that the issue in strict liability, failure-to-
warn cases was whether, assuming that the manufacturer was aware of the defective 
nature of the product, it [the manufacturer) acted in a reasonably prudent manner in 
marketing the product or providing the warnings given. At this point, however, the 
court's analysis reveals some confusion. Discussing available knowledge in the defective 
warning situation, the court followed the test of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A 
comment j (1965), and asked, "Did the defendant know, or should he have known, of the 
danger, given the scientific, technological, and other information available when the 
product was distributed ... ?" 97 N.J. at 452, 479 A.2d at 386. The court then shifted 
the burden of proof to defendant to show that it [the manufacturer) Jacked actual or 
constructive knowledge of the defect at the time of marketing. 
Because the Feldman court is in effect saying that it will apply strict liability and 
assume that defendant knew of the dangerous propensity of the product unless defen-
dant can prove that it did not know and should not have known of the danger, the cause 
of action becomes negligence with the burden on defendant to prove no actual or con-
structive knowledge of the danger associated with its product. Whether a New Jersey 
court decides to apply negligence or "strict liability" to a given case involving prescrip-
tion drugs, the court will be applying a negligence standard to the manufacturer's con-
duct. Therefore, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965) exemp-
tion of drug~ from strict liability enters Feldman through the back door. 
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often do not surface until there has been substantial use of the 
drug. 00 On the other hand, engineering safety cases rarely in-
volve questions of after-acquired risk knowledge.100 With those 
two major areas adequately covered by the negligence principle, 
there exists little need for polluting the legal atmosphere with 
strict liability terminology. 101 
Unfortunately, a small cadre of courts continues to insist on 
saddling a defendant with true strict liability, effectively impos-
ing on the defendant all the risk information available at the 
time oftrial. As Dean Wade has demonstrated, however, most of 
the policy reasons that support strict liability cut against the 
utilization of a "time of trial" standard.102 I can only conclude 
that strict liability language adds little but confusion to the 
proper decision in a design defect or failure-to-warn case. It rep-
resents the straw man of modern product liability law. The time 
has come to return to the normalcy of the well-understood and 
easily applied negligence principle. 
Finally, there remains the question whether a federal negli-
gence standard would alter the result in O'Brien v. Muskin 
Corp. 103 Candor requires one to admit that a court intent upon 
accomplishing the result in O'Brien could do so even under a 
negligence regime. I would like, however, to make two observa-
tions about this problem. First, even under the unwieldy bills 
that have been introduced, courts could still reach the O'Brien 
result. 104 Second, the imposition of a federal standard would 
probably have a leavening effect on state courts. Congress would 
be sending the message that the nation feels that courts have 
unreasonably expanded liability. 1011 Moreover, the fact that fed-
eral courts will be interpreting the meaning of the negligence 
standard will also have an inhibiting effect. Although the United 
99. See Wheeler & Kress, supra note 69, at 141-43. 
100. Id. at 142. 
101. See Birnbaum, supra note 9; Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Lia-
bility, 61 'Tux. L. REv. 777 (1983). 
102. Wade, supra note 29, at 754-56 (1983). 
103. 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983). 
104. See, e.g., S. 100, supra note 1, § 5(b)(2)(A) (requiring proof of practical techno-
logical feasibility and favorable risk-utility assessment to declare product "not unreason-
ably dangerous"). H.R. 7000, supra note 2, § 5(c)(l) (setting forth basic risk-utility anal-
ysis). But see S. 44, supra note 2, § 5(b) (requiring alternative design as an element of 
prima facie case). It should be noted that S. 44 would totally prohibit a plaintiff's recov-
ery no matter how dangerous the product unless an alternative design could be estab-
lished. As noted in the text this position is hard to justify. See supra text accompanying 
supra note 35. 
105. Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A 
Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 233 (1978-79). 
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States Supreme Court will probably not regularly intervene to 
bring state and federal courts into line, 106 one cannot disregard 
the Court's potential for involvement. State and federal courts 
will likely read the federal negligence standard for design and 
failure-to-warn cases as a mandate for moderation in this genre 
of litigation. 
II. THE CRISIS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Courts and scholars have both extensively addressed the im-
pact of punitive damages on product liability litigation.107 There 
106. See § 9 of the proposed bill. See also S. 100, supra note 1, § 18. 
107. The writings of Professor David Owen have been very influential. In his 1976 
article, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257 (1976), 
Owen gave strong support to the position that punitive damages have a legitimate role to 
play in products litigation. In his 1982 article, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages 
Against Manufacturing Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited 
as Owen, Assessing Punitive Damages], Professor Owen is far more tentative. Although 
he still argues for their retention, he points to the potential for serious abuse of punitive 
damages. See also Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages 
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, nn.1-2 (1983) (comprehensive listing of scholarly 
literature). 
In Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 113, 121-23, 472 A.2d 577, 582-83 
(App. Div. 1984) the court reviewed the case law and noted that the following jurisdic-
tions have allowed for punitive damages in products liability cases: Alaska-Sturm, Rug-
ger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981) 
(re~olver); Arkansas-Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 · 
S.W.2d 720 (1981) (grain cart); California-Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 
3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (automobile fuel system); Delaware-Cloroben Chem. 
Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887 (Del. 1983) (sulfuric acid drain cleaner); Florida-Piper 
Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (aircraft part); Ha-
waii-Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975) (helicopter part); 
Illinois-Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982) (asbestos); 
Indiana-Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ind. 1981) (motor boat); 
Minnesota-Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied 
sub. nom. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921 (1980) (flammable child's pajamas); 
Missouri-Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (idle cam); 
New York-Baleno by Baleno v. Jacuzzi Research, Inc., 93 A.D.2d 982, 461 N.Y.S.2d 659 
(1983) (hydrotherapy unit); Ohio-Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 
(6th Cir. 1982) (asbestos); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 
N.E.2d 568 (1981) (roll bar on jeep); Oklahoma-Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 
P.2d 515 (Okla. 1983) (asbestos); Oregon-State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 
618 P.2d 1268 (1980); Pennsylvania-Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (asbestos), and Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 
1973) (prescription drug); South Carolina-Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. 
Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 
1981) (roofing material); Tennessee-Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th 
Cir. 1976) (charcoal grill); Texas-Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., Inc. v. Daniels, 619 
S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (football helmet); Virgin Islands-Acosta v. Honda 
Motor Co., Ltd., 717 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1983) (motorcycle); Wisconsin-Wangen v. Ford 
Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (fuel tank). But see Jackson v. Johns-
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is little need to repeat the arguments pro and con. Two argu-
ments that support the imposition of federal standards control-
ling punitive damages have, however, received inadequate 
attention. 
A. Risk-Utility Analysis and Punitive Damages 
Courts have almost exclusively imposed punitive damages in 
design defect and failure-to-warn cases.108 The inadvertent pro-
duction defect case that occurs because of imperfect quality con-
trol rarely, if ever, involves the kind of reckless conduct that 
would support punitive damages. Only design defect and failure-
to-warn cases involve the kind of "conscious design choice" that 
permits a plaintiff plausibly to allege that the defendant be-
haved so egregiously that a court should impose punitive dam-
ages. As noted earlier, both design and failure-to-warn cases re-
quire the plaintiff to establish that the defendant failed to meet 
the standard for product safety that risk-utility balancing man-
dates.109 By definition, this balancing process requires a con-
scious weighing of alternative designs and warnings against the 
cost of implementing such changes. To inject punitive damages 
blithely, without carefully limiting the occasions in which courts 
may impose them, threatens the entire structure of product lia-
bility litigation. 
It is simply unfair to ask defendant-manufacturers to balance 
safety, utility, aesthetics, and cost and then to censure them 
with punitive damages merely because we disagree with their as-
sessment. It is altogether too easy, after the fact, to dredge up 
an in-house memorandum in which the defendant honestly con-
sidered cost factors and to utilize it as "smoking gun" evidence 
of the defendant's evil intent. As Professor Owen has noted, the 
argument that the manufacturer "traded [your] life for a dollar 
[in profit]" has great jury appeal.U° Furthermore, if a manufac-
turer places itself in jeopardy of suffering punitive damages 
every time it subjects its risk-utility balancing to scrutiny, one 
can expect that documentation will be driven underground. m 
Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984) and the en bane decision reversing the 
original panel, 750 F.2d 1314 (1985). 
108. See cases cited supra note 107. 
109. See authorities cited supra note 41. 
110. Owen, Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 107, at 11. 
111. Id. at 16-19; see also Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspec-
tives, supra note 41, at 369-72. 
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One can say little in favor of relegating important management 
decisions to the paper shredder. Courts must exercise heavy con-
trol in this emotion-laden area precisely because the issues that 
support punitive damages so closely relate to the issues that 
support legitimate or marginally erroneous risk-utility decision 
making. 
B. Punitive Damages and Decision Making 
When, in the context of litigation, manufacturers recognize 
that they have made design errors or failed to warn about dan-
gers adequately, they are naturally inclined to settle the case. By 
and large, experienced lawyers can calculate with some accuracy 
the range within which the potential judgment would fall and 
are thus able to settle. 112 Discounting for the risk of potential 
loss and weighing that risk against the possibility of attaining a 
verdict at the higher reaches of the projected range is a process 
with which the plaintiffs' bar is extremely familiar. To be sure, 
this is not an exact science; rather, it is an art form that operates 
within discernible guidelines. 
When the prospect of punitive damages enters the picture, 
these guidelines disappear. It is close to impossible to negotiate 
sensibly with a plaintiff who believes that he can shoot for the 
moon. Furthermore, a defendant who believes that the situation 
does not call for punitive damages cannot factor their potential 
into settlement discussions. To do so is to set a pattern for all 
future settlements in countless cases already in litigation or yet 
to be brought. In short, unless the situation truly calls for puni-
tive damages, they sabotage settlement negotiations by thrusting 
a huge "unknown" into the negotiations. 
C. Punitive Damages-A Rational Solution 
To bring stability, predictability, and fairness to punitive 
damages, manufacturers need clearly articulated standards that 
set forth the kind of aggravated conduct for which courts will 
impose punitive damages. To ensure that courts control those 
standards, a plaintiff should have to prove by "clear and con-
112. See, e.g., C. BADWAY, EVALUATION AND SETTLEMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY CASES 
(1980); N. SHAYNE, EVALUATING AND NEGOTIATING SETTLEMENTS IN PERSONAL INJURY 
CASES (1982). 
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vincing evidence" that the defendant violated them. The imposi-
tion of a standard higher than the "preponderance of evidence" 
standard provides the trial judge with a mechanism for rejecting 
punitive damages when the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 
clearly that egregious fault caused the design error or the failure 
to warn. The key is to provide the trial judge with a screening 
mechanism to exclude punitive damages from run-of-the-mill 
products cases. 
The proposed statute thus imposes both a high threshold for 
the nature of the conduct that justifies the imposition of puni-
tive damages and the "clear and convincing evidentiary stand-
ard" for proving that the defendant breached that standard. It 
does not, however, remove the issue from the jury. These safe-
guards adequately protect defendants. The proposed statute es-
chews artificial limitations on punitive damages that either im-
pose an artificial cap or prohibit repetitive punitive damage 
awards against an individual defendant for the same design or 
warning error. 113 Instead, the jury considers these factors in ren-
dering its verdict. The trial judge and the reviewing court may 
also consider them in deciding whether the award is excessive. 
One can marshall strong arguments in favor of the more radi-
cal limitations on punitive damages. 114 I have rejected them for 
two reasons. First, tough standards and a higher evidentiary 
burden should provide sufficient protection and reduce the prob-
lem to manageable proportions. Second, the political realities 
dictate a more measured response. Consumer groups have waged 
a vigorous attack on artificial limitations on punitive damages. 1 u 
To allow a truly malevolent corporation to wash its hands by 
paying a sum certain that bears no relation to its bad faith does 
not seem fair. Compensatory damages do not eliminate this un-
fairness because the corporation's malevolence may far exceed 
the damages it will have to pay to injured consumers. Indeed, 
there may be few actual injuries, or these injuries may be minor; 
thus, the corporation may still gain significant profit from the 
113. See H.R. 5214, supra note 2, § 11; S. 44, supra note 2, § 12(g) (as amended); S. 
REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1984). 
The approach suggested herein which seeks substantive limitations on punitive dam-
ages but which rejects capping was adopted by the Wisconsin court in Wangen v. Ford 
Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980). 
114. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 254 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd 
in part, rev'd in part, 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane rehearing). 
115. S. 2631 Hearings, supra note 2, at 132, 271 (statement of David I. Greenberg, 
Legislative Director, Consumer Fed'n of Am.); S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 
341 (statement of Public Citizen's Congress Watch). 
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sale of the product. Sheer luck should not excuse malevolence 
where, in fact, it is found to exist. One cannot lightly set aside 
these arguments; they have very strong political appeal. Conse-
quently, any attempt to control punitive damages must avoid 
the extremes. 
III. THE CRISIS OF CONFLICTING REPARATION SYSTEMS-TORTS 
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
A federal product liability law must unquestionably address 
the injustices that result from the conflict between the tort and 
the workers' compensation systems. 116 In most states, an em-
ployer who pays workers' compensation benefits to an employee 
injured at the workplace while operating a piece of defective ma-
chinery has a subrogation lien against the plaintiff's ultimate 
tort recovery from the product manufacturer.117 The employer 
retains this lien even if it was primarily responsible for the 
injury.118 
The present situation is intolerable. The no-fault workers' 
compensation system bears no responsibility whatsoever for the 
employers' faulty conduct. By permitting the subrogation lien in 
favor of the employer, it does more than protect the workers' 
compensation system from tort recovery: it protects workers' 
compensation from itself. It does so by benefiting from the tort 
recovery system without having to pay allegiance to the princi-
ples of the system from which it seeks recovery. The tort system 
would not allow the third-party action without inquiry into the 
fault of the parties inter se.119 
This problem has substantial significance because employees 
implicate employer fault in over half of all employment related 
product liability claims.120 Manufacturers justifiably complain 
116. Much of this discussion is reflected in my earlier article dealing with S. 2631. 
See Twerski, supra note 26, at 463-69. 
117. See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 74.00 (1983); see also 
Casey, The Relationship Between Products Liability and Worker Compensa-
tion-Third Party Rights Against Negligent Employers, 32 FED. INs. CouNs. Q. 23 
(1981). 
118. See Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers' Compensation Em-
ployer, 1982 DUKE L.J. 483, 488. 
119. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 88, § 50. 
120. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECH• 
NICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS REPORT 10, 61-66 (1978). According to the study, 
plaintiffs implicate employer negligence in 56.3% of all employment related product lia-
bility claims. The conclusion that negligence was involved in such a surprisingly high 
percentage of claims was based on responses to the following question: "Would the in-
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that under most state rules the most guilty party often walks 
away from the lawsuit without contributing anything to the 
plaintiff's recovery. Instead, the product liability (tort) system 
bears the entire cost of the injury. 
At the other extreme, several states have permitted the prod-
ucts manufacturer to join the employer in order to recover con-
tribution based on proportional fault. 121 In these states, the 
third-party action has invaded the immunity of the workers' 
compensation system. What a plaintiff cannot accomplish 
through the direct action against the employer, the manufac-
turer can accomplish through the contribution action. 122 If there 
was wisdom in creating a system immune to full scale tort recov-
ery, then it is hard to justify this end-run that subjects the em-
ployer to the same liability. 
sured have implicated the employer but for the Sole Remedy Rule?" The answer to this 
question, which by inference leads to the conclusion that employer fault was probably 
involved, resulted in 50.1 % affirmative and 49.9% negative answers. When the question 
was phrased to reflect the percentage of claims with reference to total dollars paid out, 
the breakdown was 56.3% affirmative and 43.7% negative. The insured's somewhat 
greater likelihoo~ of impleading the employer, but for the Sole Remedy Rule, in the 
bigger cases explains this disparity. The 29% larger average payment in cases when the 
plaintiff affirmatively answered the question set forth above corroborates this indication. 
See id. at 67, Table 10-2. 
121. See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N. Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N. Y.S.2d 
382 (1972); Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 
437 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978). But see Contribution Among Joint 
Tortfeasors Act § 2, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 302 (1979). Professor Larson contends that 
the 1979 statu~ would prohibit the result in Skinner because it authorizes contribution 
"where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury." 
Larson, supra note 118, at 499-500. 
122. In Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 
(1972), the New York Court of Appeals held that an action brought by the manufacturer 
against the employer for indemnity was "very different" than a direct action by the em-
ployee against the employer. Id. at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390. While 
the latter was barred by the Workman's Compensation Act, the recovery by third party 
plaintiff (the manufacturer) was "based on a separable legal entity of rights." Id. The 
court could therefore hold negligent employer financially responsible to the manufac-
turer for the employer's full share of the blame in decedent's wrongful death which, 
depending on the jury's findings, would range from no apportionment to full indemnity. 
Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92. 
The Illinois Supreme Court reached a similar result in holding that their Workmen's 
Compensation Act did not preclude a contribution action by the manufacturer against 
the employer. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 
437 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978). Thus, even though the plaintiff employee 
could not bring an action against his employer, the third-party plaintiff (manufacturer) 
could seek recovery from the employer whose alleged "misuse of the product or assump-
tion of the risk of its use" contributed to employees' injuries. Id. at 15, 374 N.E.2d at 
443. But see supra note 121. 
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Resolving the Confiict 
Subtracting the workers' compensation recovery from the tort 
recovery and abolishing the employer subrogation lien present 
the simplest method for resolving the conflict between the two 
reparation systems. 123 Because it adopts such an approach, the 
proposed law would permit the plaintiff to retain the very same 
benefits he now enjoys and, at the same time, shift part of the 
cost from the manufacturer to the employer where it rightfully 
belongs. 
One might argue that the proposed statute would accomplish 
"mirror image" injustice.12• In effect, the fault-based defendant 
could shift partial liability for an injury that is entirely the man-
ufacturer's fault to the no-fault system. A moment's reflection, 
however, will reveal that this situation breeds little · injustice. 
The workers' compensation system, which was established to 
provide limited recovery for work-related injury, would, in fact, 
be paying for a work-related injury. 
To deny the employer who was truly not at fault his third-
party action may be somewhat unfair. It does not, however, vio-
late basic principles of fairness to recognize that when a no-fault 
system operates side-by-side with a fault system, it is best to 
permit each system to work separately. 125 Methods exist to as-
sure that only the truly noimegligent employer recovers the full 
subrogation lien and that the negligent employer does not re-
cover the portion of the subrogation lien that represents its per-
centage of fault. 128 These methods, however, would require that 
123. This approach was advocated by Professor Richard Epstein in Coordination of 
Worker's Compensation Benefits with Tort Damage Awards, 13 FORUM 464 (1978) and 
in the AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATION PACKAGE 65-66 
(1977). It was subsequently proposed in S. 2631, supra note 2, § 11; H.R. 5214, supra 
note 2, § 10; and MUPLA, supra note 2, § 114. It has been enacted in CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 52-572(r) (West Supp. 1984). 
124. See Davis, The Interaction of Worker's Compensation and Products Liability, 
TRIAL, Nov. 1979, at 31, 33. 
125. This debate is of ancient vintage. See James, Contribution Among Joint 
Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1941); Gregory, Contribution 
Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1170 (1941). The argument in 
favor of the James position is stronger when contribution is being sought across two 
different liability systems. 
126. See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, supra note 120, at 72-74; Draft Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Law (UPLL) § 113, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 3001 (1979). The 
MUPLA, supra note 2, § 114, changed the UPLL approach that allowed the manufac-
turer contribution up to the 81Ilount of the worker compensation lien "where the em-
ployer's failure to comply with any statutory or common law duty contributed to the 
claimant's injuries." UPLL § 113. The UPLL approach does have some support in case 
law. See Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1974); Lambertson 
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a court try the issue of fault and apportion it between the em-
ployer and manufacturer to assure that the employer does not 
receive more than his equitable share in the subsequent contri-
bution action. 127 Such an approach would not only increase 
transaction costs, it would also present to the jury difficult ap-
portionment questions that relate to the workplace setting 
where fault apportionment may be difficult to accomplish. 128 
Finally, the proposed statute will preclude a manufacturer 
from bringing a contribution action against an employer. This 
will assure the immunity of the workers' compensation system. 
Although at present only a handful of states provide for such 
contribution, the dissatisfaction with the present system could 
cause other states to follow the lead of New York and Illinois by 
permitting contribution to redress the grievances of manufactur-
ers. 129 The proposed statute resolves the conflicting interests in a 
Solomon-like fashion. It enjoys broad-based support from insur-
ers and manufacturers. Consumer groups have no partisan inter-
est in the matter because plaintiffs will retain the full recovery 
the tort system grants them. The legislation only affects contri-
bution between the defendant manufacturer and the employer. 
If anything, eliminating the subrogation lien should increase em-
ployers' care by holding them liable for the workers' compensa-
tion share of the ultimate recovery. Consumers and manufactur-
ers should both welcome this nudge toward added safety. 
IV. THE CRISIS OF THE INNOCENT DEFENDANT 
Most jurisdictions hold retailers and wholesalers strictly liable 
. as sellers of defective products.130 These retailers and wholesal-
ers complain that for the most part they must ride along as de-
v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977). 
127. See authorities cited supra note 126. 
128. Id. 
129. See supra note 122. 
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See, e.g., Canifax v. Hercu-
les Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965); Hiigel v. General Motors 
Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); Brannon v. Southern Ill. Hosp. Corp., 69 Ill. 
App. 3d 1, 386 N.E.2d 1126 (1978); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 
(Mo. 1969); Ortiz v. Farrell Co., 171 N.J. Super. 109, 407 A.2d 1290 (1979); Mead v. 
Warner Pruyn Div., 57 A.D.2d 340, 394 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1977); Chandler v. Northwest 
Eng'g Co., 111 Misc. 2d 433, 444 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1981); Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, Inc., 
307 Pa. Super. 131, 452 A.2d 1349 (1982). But see Ellis v. Rich's Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 212 
S.E.2d 373 (1975); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Walker v. Decora, 
Inc., 221 Tenn. 504, 471 S.W.2d 778 (1971). 
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fondants in cases in which they bear no ultimate liability.131 
Even if courts enforced judgments against these intermediate 
sellers, they would be entitled to full indemnity because they 
bear no actual responsibility for the product defect. 
The proposed bill permits courts to release the nonmanufac-
turing seller from the case unless: (1) it cannot assert jurisdic-
tion over the manufacturer; (2) there exists a "reasonable likeli-
hood" that the plaintiff will ultimately be unable to collect a 
judgment against a manufacturer; or (3) the plaintiff alleges pri-
mary negligence against the nonmanufacturing seller.132 For all 
practical purposes the proposed bill tracks the philosophy of 
previous legislative efforts. The most significant change is that 
the intermediary remains in the case if there exists a "reasona-
ble likelihood" that the plaintiff will be unable to collect the 
judgment against the manufacturer. The previously introduced 
bills required a court to determine that the claimant "would be 
unable" to enforce a judgment against a manufacturer. Even 
with its "reasonable likelihood" standard, the suggested change 
creates a potential that an innocent plaintiff will suffer if the 
court guesses wrong and insolvency problems develop in the lag 
time between pleading and judgment. 
Nonetheless, trade-offs are in order. The transaction costs of 
keeping a "dummy" defendant in the case are significant. If the 
plaintiff can be assured that a court has made a good faith effort 
to determine whether trouble is over the horizon, that should be 
sufficient. It would simply be unfair to adopt an alternative that 
loads nonproductive legal costs on a system that is already 
overburdened with them. In essence, the one-in-a-million case 
should not govern the law of product liability. 
V. THE CRISIS OF IGNORANCE 
Damages provide the critical link between legal rules and the 
. behavior of individuals in the real world. Although the fairness 
and economic efficiency of our tort system depend upon appro-
priate damage awards, we have no useful damage award data on 
which to evaluate the efficacy of our legal rules. To the extent 
we rely on these awards to allocate funds for the development of 
safer products, legislators and manufacturers alike cannot con-
131. S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 199 (statement of Dirk Van Dongen, 
President, National Association of Wholesalers-Distributors). 
132. See infra §§ 4, 5 of the proposed bill. 
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tinue to operate under this veil of ignorance. 
Consequently, we need a comprehensive study of the actual 
facts concerning damages in products liability litigation. It is 
time to know which fears are real and which are imagined. Un-
like previously introduced bills, this bill seeks no new study of 
future legislative alternatives to the present liability system. 
Before a legislature undertakes any such initiative, it must know 
with far greater precision the dimensions of the problems facing 
both consumers and manufacturers. The proposed bill calls for a 
thorough empirical study of damages and their effects on con-
sumers and industry. 133 
VI. STATUTORY REFORM-STRUCTURE AND ANALYSIS 
The product liability statute that I propose differs signifi-
cantly from past legislative proposals. To date, congressional 
committees have been presented with comprehensive product li-
ability codes that purport to deal with all phases of the cause of 
action.13" They have addressed the following issues: production 
defect, design defect, failure to warn, instructions, express war-
ranty, product misuse, product alteration, contributory fault, as-
sumption of risk, unavoidably dangerous products, inherently 
dangerous products, obvious dangers, technological feasibility, li-
ability of wholesalers and retailers, joint and several liability, 
statutes of repose and statutes of limitation, workers' compensa-
tion, punitive damages, and subsequent remedial measures. In 
fact, the bill introduced last year attempted to compress two 
hundred years of tort case law into twenty-nine printed pages.13& 
Little wonder that it was self-contradictory, ambiguous, and 
substantively unfair to both consumers and manufacturers.136 
The legislation I propose does not seek to rewrite the law of 
133. This study should address questions such as the following: How much money is 
truly sufficient to compensate a seriously injured plaintiff? What, in fact, is the actual 
relationship between economic loss damages, and pain and suffering damages in product 
liability cases? Is there a difference between damages depending on product category? 
Do drug cases draw damages awards that are greater than injuries of comparable severity 
arising out of auto defects? Are punitive damages the monster that they are made out to 
be? Has the availability of repetitive punitive damages been a significant factor in prod-
uct liability litigation, and, if so, have such damage awards been unfair to corporations? 
What is the relationship between punitive damages and settlement practice? 
134. See supra notes 1 and 2. 
135. S. 44, supra note 2, § 90. 
136. S. 44 Hearings (Part 2), supra note 2, at 481-94 (letter from Professor Aaron D. 
Twerski to Hon. Ernest F. Hollings). 
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torts nor to legislate in problem-free areas. It does not curb the 
courts from developing reasonable case law with regard to issues 
that have not yet been fully explored. It eschews the use of con-
voluted language that seeks to limit traditional fact-finding by 
juries. Instead, the proposed federal statute takes dead aim at 
the crisis issues. In my opinion, the five topics my proposed leg-
islation addresses constitute the only issues that threaten the in-
tegrity of products litigation. Having taken the position that 
federal legislation need only respond to those areas that 
threaten the integrity of product liability litigation, I will now 
explain why I have excluded other issues that previous bills have 
included. 
A. Unavoidably Dangerous Product 
Many of the proposed bills have provided special exceptions 
from liability for the "unavoidably dangerous product".137 These 
sections attempt to rephrase comment (k) to section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts in more elegant language.138 In 
137. S. 100, supra note 1, §§ 5(b)(2)(B), 5(b)(3); H.R. 2729, supra note 2, § 
5(c)(4)(C); S. 44, supra note 2, § 5(C); S. 2631, supra note 2, § 5(C); H.R. 7000, supra 
note 2, §§ 7(a), (b). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment k (1965) covering "unavoidably un-
safe products" states: 
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the pre-
sent state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their 
intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. 
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, 
which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when 
it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both 
the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the 
unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly 
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, 
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vac-
cines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold 
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in 
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of 
time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assur-
ance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as 
there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically 
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that 
they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where 
the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate conse-
quences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the 
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known 
but apparently reasonable risk. 
138. See, e.g., S. 100, supra note 1: 
Sec. 5(b)(2). A product is not unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation 
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light of the adoption of a negligence standard for both design 
and failure-to-warn cases, there is no need to add a special sec-
tion dealing with unavoidably dangerous products. It could only 
needlessly confuse the courts and complicate litigation. 
One need not deny that defendants should not be held liable 
for all unavoidable dangers that can result from the use of a 
product. Allergic reactions to drugs such as penicillin exemplify 
this product category. Still, legislators need not create a special 
statutory exemption to absolve penicillin manufacturers from li-
ability. Given the negligence standard that governs all design 
and warning cases, penicillin simply does not constitute an un-
reasonably dangerous product. 189 Its benefits far outweigh its 
known risks. 
Manufacturers may still have to warn consumers from time to 
time about unavoidable risks so that consumers can choose 
whether they wish to take the chance with the medication or 
suffer the ills that will befall them if they do not take the drug. 
None of the proposed bills free the manufacturer of an unavoid-
ably dangerous product from warning about "unavoidable dan-
gers. " 140 Thus, the manufacturer has either reasonably designed 
if the manufacturer proves by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the 
relevant point in time-
(B) the harm was caused by an unavoidably dangerous 
product .... 
Sec. 5(b)(3). As used in paragraph (2)(B), "an unavoidably dangerous product" 
means a product that, at the relevant point in time-
(A) is useful and desirable to the public; 
(B) has a known but reasonable risk which, in the light of the 
state of scientific and technical knowledge at that time, can-
not be made safe without impairing the effectiveness of the 
product's intended and ordinary use; and 
(C) would have been made by a reasonable manufacturer using 
that particular design or formulation. 
S. 44, supra note 2: 
Sec. 5(c). A product is not unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation if 
the harm was caused by an unavoidably dangerous aspect of a product. As 
used in this paragraph, an "unavoidably dangerous aspect" means that aspect 
of a product which could not, in light of knowledge which was reasonably ac-
cepted in the scientific, technical, or medical community at the time of manu-
facture, have been eliminated without seriously impairing the effectiveness 
with which the product performs its intended function or the desirability, eco-
nomic and otherwise, of the product to the person who uses or consumes it. 
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment (k) (1965) (quoted supra 
note 137). 
140. See, e.g., H.R. 7000, supra note 2: 
Sec. 7(a). Notwithstanding section 5 or 6, a product seller shall not be subject 
to liability for harm caused by an unavoidably dangerous aspect of a product 
unless-
(!) the product seller knew or had reason to know of such aspect 
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the so-called "unavoidably dangerous" product (in effect, has 
not designed it negligently) or has adequately warned against 
the product's danger. Because the proposed bill adequately pro-
vides for both contingencies by predicating liability only after 
negligence has been established, there is no need for the sepa-
rate section. 
B. Comparative Fault 
In an article dealing with an earlier legislative initiative, I sug-
gested the need to settle the controversy over the applicability 
of comparative fault to strict product liability.1" 1 Even then, I 
did not advocate stripping the state courts of the right to decide 
in which cases they should reduce the plaintiff's verdict by the 
percentage of his or her fault. 142 I now recant my earlier opinion. 
Not only is there no need to legislate in this area, I believe that 
legislation would likely create havoc. 
The comparative negligence revolution is almost complete. At 
last count, forty-three states had adopted some form of compar-
ative fault. 143 The vast majority of states that have passed on 
and ... 
(2) failed to meet a duty to provide instructions or warnings under sec-
tion 5 or 6. 
See also Twerski, supra note 26, at 430 (discussing S. 2631). 
141. See Twerski, supra note 26, at 458-63. 
142. Id. at 463. 
143. (1) Alaska, Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); (2) Arizona, AR1z. REV. 
STAT. ANN.§ 12-1205-09 (Supp. 1984); (3) Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1963 to -1965 
(1979); (4) California, Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 
858 (1975); (5) Colorado, Cow. REV. STAT. § 13-21-406 (Supp. 1984); (6) Connecticut, 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-5720 (Supp. 1984); (7) Delaware, DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 
10-8132 (Supp. 1984); (8) Florida, Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); (9) Ha-
waii, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); (10) Idaho, IDAHO CODE§§ 6-803 to -806 (1979); 
(11) Illinois, Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); (12) Indiana, IND. CoDE 
ANN. §§ 34-4-33-1 to -6 (West Supp. 1984); (13) Iowa, IowA CoDE § 668.3 (1984); (14) 
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1983); (15) Kentucky, Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 
713 (Ky. 1984); (16) Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2323 (West Supp. 1985); (17) 
Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); (18) Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1984); (19) Michigan, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.2949 
(West Supp. 1984); (20) Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1984); (21) 
Mississippi, Miss. CoDE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); (22) Missouri, Gustafson v. Benda, 661 
S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983); (23) Montana, MoNT. CoDE. ANN.§§ 27-1-702 to -703 (1983); (24) 
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); (25) Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 
(1979); (26) New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 507:7-a (1983); (27) New Jersey, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (Supp. 1984); (28) New Mexico, Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 
682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); (29) New York, N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW AND RULES § 1411 (Mc-
Kinney 1976); (30) North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1976); (31) Ohio, Omo 
REv. CoDE. ANN. § 2315.19 (Page 1981); (32) Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13-14 
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the applicability of comparative fault to product liability cases 
have permitted the reduction to take place when plaintiff has 
been at fault. 14' In some instances, states have exempted some 
particular form of plaintiff conduct from comparative fault. 1411 
Nevertheless, these exceptions may, on a case-by-case basis, be 
totally justified. Furthermore, no matter how sweeping the lan-
guage of legislation, courts will find the latitude to carve out ex-
ceptions when the failure to do so will result in grave injustice. 
There is, however, a more serious problem that militates 
against a federal solution. Although four-fifths of the states have 
adopted comparative fault, they have differed sharply as to the 
preferred form of comparative fault. Sixteen states have adopted 
pure comparative fault. 146 The large majority, however, have en-
acted one of the "modified" forms of comparative fault that per-
mit a plaintiff to recover only if the plaintiff's negligence was 
either "not as great as"147 or "not greater than"148 that of the 
defendant; otherwise, the common law contributory negligence 
(West Supp. 1984); (33) Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1981); (34) Pennsylvania, PA. 
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 42-7102 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1984); (35) Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 9-20-4 to -4.1 (1984); (36) South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 
(1979); (37) Texas, TEx. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985); (38) 
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 to -43 (1977); (39) Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 
1036 (Supp. 1984); (40) Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.005 to .920 (Supp. 
1985); (41) West Virginia, Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 
879 (1979); (42) Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983); (43) Wyoming, Wvo. 
STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977). See also Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968); Vir-
gin Islands, VJ. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451 (Supp. 1982). 
144. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979); Daly v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Busch v. 
Busch Constr. Co., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 
N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft, 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); 
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). But see Correia v. Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1983); Youngs Mach. Co. v. Long, 692 P.2d 24 
(Nev. 1984). 
145. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505A (Supp. 1984). There is no right to compar-
ative negligence in favor of any claimant who has intentionally, willfully, or wantonly 
caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death. IND. CoDE ANN. § 34-4-33-2 (a) 
(West Supp. 1984). "As used in this chapter: 'Fault' includes any act or omission that is 
negligent, willful, wanton or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or 
others, but does not include an intentional act." See also Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & 
Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628, 
273 N.W.2d 233 (1979). 
146. These states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illi-
nois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Washington. See supra note 143. 
147. These states include Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. See supra note 143. 
148. This list includes Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin. See supra note 143. 
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rule governs. The federal legislative proposals adopt the "pure" 
comparative fault approach in all product liability cases. They 
give no attention to how the state and federal systems will inter-
act. If Congress enacted a statute that failed to address the in-
teraction of these two systems, I believe that serious trouble 
would follow. 
Consider the following hypothetical. Two drivers exhibit negli-
gent conduct that contributes to the collision of their respective 
cars. In addition, a brake defect in one of the cars contributed to 
the collision. A jury found the following fault percentages: 
Driver of Car No. 1 19% at fault 
Driver of Car No. 2 51 % at fault 
Car Manufacturer 30 % at fault 
Under the proposed federal bills that adopt pure comparative 
fault, the drivers of both cars could sue each other and the car 
manufacturer and could recover the totality of their damages 
less the percentage attributed to their own fault. The result in 
those states that follow the modified form of contributory fault, 
however, would be very different. The driver of car no. 2 bears 
fifty-one percent of the fault and thus could not recover any-
thing. Why should his rights change merely because the accident 
involved a defective product? 
Any attempt to resolve this problem by applying pure com-
parative fault to one part of the action and modified compara-
tive fault to the nonproduct part is doomed to failure. The case 
would take on the character of chop suey. The systems cannot 
operate on a mix-and-match basis. I conclude that because there 
is little to gain and much to lose by federal legislation in this 
area, Congress should leave this area of law to the states. 
C. Misuse and Alteration 
The proposed federal product liability bills contain convoluted 
and complex language on the issue of product misuse and altera-
tion.149 Courts would likely read the language to the jury verba-
tim; their instincts of self-defense and protection from appellate 
reversal would mandate this practice. Moreover, the misuse and 
alteration issues would ultimately raise the proximate cause is-
149. S. 100, supra note 1, §§ 9(c), (d), (0; S. 44, supra note 2, § 10; H.R. 2729, supra 
note 2, §§ 9(b)(5)(A), 9(b)(5)(B)(i), 9(b)(5)(B)(ii); S. 2631, supra note 2, § 10; H.R. 5214, 
supra note 2, § 5(c)(4); H.R. 7000, supra note 2, §§ 12(c), (d); H.R. 5626, supra note 2, §§ 
7, 8. 
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sue. 1110 If lawyers have learned anything about the law of torts in 
the last century, it is that proximate or legal cause has no simple 
verbalizations. 1111 No alternative to good judging exists to resolve 
this issue at the directed verdict stage. Once the court gives the 
case to the jury, complex verbalizations tend to impede the de-
sired product-the reaction of the community about the fairness 
of recovery in the particular case. 162 
Finally, no evidence indicates that courts have dealt with the 
misuse and alteration issue irresponsibly. By and large, compar-
ative fault principles have operated to reduce manufacturers' li-
ability. m In fact, by imposing pure comparative fault, manufac-
turers will probably not prevail as often because, in many of the 
misuse and alteration cases, plaintiff's fault exceeds the fault at-
150. For an analysis of the relationship between proximate cause and the misuse/ 
alteration problem, see Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the 
Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403 (1978); Vargo, 
The Defenses to Strict Liability in Tort: A New Vocabulary With an Old Meaning, 29 
MERCER L. REV. 447 (1978); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 88, at § 102. 
151. The attempts to capture the essence of proximate cause are legion. See, e.g., A. 
BECHT & F. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABIL-
ITY CASES (1961); L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); H.L.A. HART & A. 
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959); W. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 
(1963); McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1925); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 435-453 (1965); Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause 
and the Rational Allocations of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 
1. 
152. In Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1955), Chief Judge Magruder 
presents the clearest articulation of this view. 
When an issue of proximate cause arises in a borderline case, as not infre-
quently happens, we leave it to the jury with appropriate instructions. We do 
this because it is deemed wise to obtain the judgment of the jury, reflecting as it 
does the earthy viewpoint of the common man-the prevalent sense of the com-
munity-as to whether the causal relation between the ·negligent act and the 
plaintiff's harm which in fact was a consequence of the tortious act is sufficiently 
close to make it just and expedient to hold the defendant answerable in dam-
ages. That is what the courts have in mind when they say the question of proxi-
mate causation is one of fact for the jury . . . similar to the issue of negligence, 
which is left to the jury as an issue of fact. Even where on the evidence the facts 
are undisputed, if fair-minded men might honestly and reasonably draw con-
trary inferences as to whether the facts do or do not establish negligence, the 
court leaves such issue to the determination of the jury, who are required to 
decide, as a matter of common-sense judgment, whether the defendant's course 
of conduct subjected others to a reasonable or unreasonable risk, i.e., whether 
under all the circumstances the defendant ought to be recognized as privileged 
to do the act in question or to pursue his course of conduct with immunity from 
liability for harm to others which might result .... 
Id. at 611 (citations omitted). 
153. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3rd Cir. 1979); Sun-Valley 
Airlines Inc. v. Avco Lycoming Corp., 441 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Thibault v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 801, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); General Motors v. Hopkins, 
548 S. W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). 
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tributed to the manufacturer. In this area, Congress ought to let 
well enough alone. 
D. Statutes of Repose and Limitations 
The federal legislation that I have proposed does not provide 
for a statute of repose. The enactment of a negligence standard 
for design and warning cases removes much of the need for a 
repose statute. For plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case, they 
will have to prove that a reasonable person in the defendant's 
position would have acted otherwise. In cases where the time lag 
is substantial, the negligence is difficult to establish. Further-
more, political realities caused the drafters to include a long re-
pose period in the draft bill that only applied to capital machin-
ery.1114 Other proposed repose statutes would create exceptions 
for the latent injury cases which are the source of so much of the 
controversy. ue1 
The proposed repose periods can bring little solace to manu-
facturers. At the same time, they call forth extraordinary oppo-
sition from consumers. In the case of latent production defects, 
the consumer position has merit. If a plaintiff can establish that 
a product was, in fact, defective at the time sold, there is little 
reason that the age of the product should serve as a defense. 
Because politics preclude the accomplishment of significant pro-
tection for manufacturers at the federal level, there is no good 
reason to jeopardize important substantive reform for the sake 
of so little. There is also much to be said for the experiment of 
federalism on this issue. Many states have enacted statutes of 
repose, 1116 and it would be worthwhile to monitor the results at 
the state level before taking precipitous federal action. 
The enactment of a statute of limitation tied to discovery of 
injury would represent a real accomplishment. Some of the state 
statutes truly prejudice claimants. m If Congress enacts a repose 
154. S. 100, supra note 1, § 11; S. 44, supra note 2, § 12; S. 2631, supra note 2, § 12. 
155. E.g., S. 100, supra note 1, § 11 (b)(3); S. 44, supra note 2, § 12(b)(3); S. 2631, 
supra note 2, § 11(8)(2) (alternate section); H.R. 7000, supra note 2, § 10(5)(2)(8). 
156. See, e.g., Alabama, ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (c) (Supp. 1984); Arizona, AR1z. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (West 1982); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031 (West 1982); Illinois, 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213(d) (Smith-Hurd 1984). For a more thorough listing of 
state statutes of repose, see In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 879 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
157. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(b) (1980); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 
(1984). Statutes which run from the time of injury have been narrowly construed. See, 
e.g., Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 62 N.Y.2d 888, 467 N.E.2d 517, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853 
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statute, then fairness dictates a balance between it and a discov-
ery statute. States, however, are actively reviewing their statutes 
of limitation. uis Many have responded to the very special 
problems raised by latent disease cases. 1119 In this area, federal 
legislation provides neither salvation for manufacturers nor a 
bonanza for consumers and, therefore, Congress should leave 
this legislation to the states. 
CONCLUSION 
A need exists to clarify the law of product liability in several 
areas that have reached the "crisis" stage. The bill that I have 
proposed would accomplish the following reforms. First, section 
four addresses the crisis in standards for liability in defective 
design and failure-to-warn cases. It eliminates strict liability 
and, instead, judges these cases on a negligence standard. It then 
gives the plaintiff the burden of proving negligence. It also dis-
cards the consumer expectation test in these defective design 
and failure-to-warn cases and prohibits the introduction of post-
distribution modification evidence in those states that forbid the 
use of such evidence in negligence cases. Finally, it does not hold 
manufacturers liable for failing to warn about dangers that they 
could not have foreseen at the time of distribution, nor does it 
hold them liable for not implementing design changes that were 
not economically or technologically feasible at the time of 
distribution. 
Second, section seven responds to the crisis of standards for 
the imposition of punitive damages. It permits these damages 
only in cases of reckless disregard of human safety. To obtain 
punitive damages, the plaintiff has to establish the defendant's 
recklessness by clear and convincing evidence. 
Third, section six deals with the crisis in rules for allocating 
damages between the tort and workers' compensation systems. 
It reduces an employee-plaintiff's product liability claim by the 
amount of workers' compensation benefits. It also denies an em-
(1984); Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981). 
158. Courts and legislators have been actively reviewing these policies in which the 
statute of limitations bars a cause of action before discovery of the injury. See, e.g., Pof-
fenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981); Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 · 
Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 52-577a (West Supp. 1984); 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213(d)(Smith-Hurd 1984). 
159. ALA. CoDE § 6-5-502(b) (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 6-1303(2)(b)(4) (Supp. 
1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303(b)(D) (1983). 
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player, or its workers' compensation insurer, any implied indem-
nity against a manufacturer or seller for a defective product 
claim and denies a third-party tortfeasor any implied indemnity 
against the employer. 
Finally, section five addresses the crisis in the rules governing 
the liability of intermediary sellers who bear no responsibility 
for product quality. These sellers, namely wholesalers and retail-
ers, are held liable for their primary negligence. They are also 
held liable as manufacturers if the plaintiff cannot assert juris-
diction over the defendant or if the court determines that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff would be unable to 
enforce a judgment against the manufacturer. · 
These four very short and easily understandable sections con-
tain the substantive provisions that would accomplish these 
goals. They should not complicate the law nor confuse juries. It 
is time for the adoption of this "moderate and restrained" prod-
uct liability legislation.180 
VII. THE PROPOSED STATUTE 
A BILL 
To regulate interstate commerce by providing 
for uniform treatment of selected product liabil-
ity problems, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repr,esenta-
tives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, 
SHORT TITLE 
Sec. 1. This Act may be cited as the "Product Li-
ability Act.met 
160. I have purloined this phrase from the late Professor Brainerd Currie. See Currie, 
The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757 (1963). 
161. I have taken many of the sections of my proposed bill from bills that have al-
ready been introduced. In many instances I have deleted or altered language to fit the 
more limited statutory scheme outlined in the article. 
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DEFINITIONS 
Sec. 2. As used in this Act-
( I) "claimant" means any person who brings a 
product liability action, and if such an ac-
tion is brought through or on behalf of an 
estate, the term includes the claimant's de-
cedent, or if such an action is brought 
through or on behalf of a minor, the term 
includes the claimant's parent or 
guardian;162 
(2) "clear and convincing evidence" is that 
measure or degree of proof that will pro-
duce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm 
belief or conviction as to the truth of the al-
legations sought to be established; the level 
of proof required to satisfy this standard is 
more than that required under preponder-
ance of the evidence, but less than that re-
quired for proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt;163 
(3) "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, 
or transportation (A) between a place in a 
State and any place outside of that State; 
or (B) which affects trade, commerce, or 
transportation described in clause (A);16" 
(4) "manufacturer" means (A) any person who 
is engaged in a business to design or for-
mulate and to produce, create, make, or 
construct any product (or component part 
of a product); (B) a product seller with re-
spect to all aspects of a product (or compo-
nent part of a product) which are created 
or affected when, before placing the prod-
uct in the stream of commerce, the product 
seller designs or formulates and produces, 
creates, makes, or constructs an aspect of a 
product (or component part of a product) 
made by another; or (C) any product seller 
not described in clause (B) which holds it-
162. This provision's source is S. 100, supra note 1, § 2(1). 
163. Id. § 2(2). 
164. Id. § 2(3). 
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self out as a manufacturer to the user of 
the product;165 
(5) "person" means any individual, corporation, 
company, association, firm, partnership, so-
ciety, joint stock company, or any other en-
tity (including any governmental entity);166 
(6) "preponderance of the evidence" is that 
measure or degree of proof which, by the 
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate 
evidence on either side, establishes that it 
is more probable than not that a fact oc-
curred or did not occur;167 
(7) "product" means any object, substance, 
mixture or raw material in a gaseous, liq-
uid or solid state which is capable of deliv-
ery itself, or as an assembled whole in a 
mixed or combined state or as a component 
part or ingredient, which is produced for in-
troduction into trade or commerce, which 
has intrinsic economic value, and which is 
intended for sale or lease to persons for 
commercial or personal use;168 
(8) "product seller" means a person who, in the 
course of a business conducted for that pur-
pose, sells, distributes, leases, installs, 
prepares, blends, packages, labels, mar-
kets, repairs, maintains, or otherwise is in-
volved in placing a product in the stream of 
commerce;169 
(9) "State" means any State of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Is-
lands, Guam, American Samoa, the North-
ern Mariana Islands, the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands, and any other territory 
or possession of the United States, or any 
165. Id. § 2(7). 
166. Id. § 2(8). 
167. Id. § 2(10). 
168. Id. § 2(11). My bill excludes human tissue, blood, or organs. The reason for this 
exclusion is that the bill does not deal with production defects. This obviates the need 
for a specific exclusion of this problem from the product liability legislation. 
169. Id. § 2(12). Because my proposed bill does not purport to be a comprehensive 
product liability code, the exclusions from coverage present in S. 100 and predecessor 
bills need not be dealt with. 
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PREEMPTION OF OTHER LAWS 
Sec. 3(a). This Act supersedes any State law re-
garding recovery for any loss or damage caused 
by a product to the extent that this Act estab-
lishes a rule of law applicable to any civil action 
brought against a manufacturer or product 
seller for loss or damage caused by a product.111 
(1) This Act shall not be construed to 
waive or affect any defense of sover-
eign immunity asserted by any State 
under any provision of law. 
(2) Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
to supersede any Federal law, except 
the Federal Employees Compensation 
Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1982)). 
(3) Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
to waive or affect any defense of sov-
ereign immunity asserted by the 
United States. 
( 4) Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
to affect the applicability of any provi-
sion of the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-
1611 (1982)).172 
(b )( 1 )Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
170. Id. § 2(15). 
to supersede- · 
(A) any environmental protection 
law that authorizes a State or a 
person to institute an action for 
civil damages,. civil penalties, in-
junctions, restitution, cost recov-
ery, punitive damages, or any 
other form of relief resulting 
from contamination or pollution 
of the environment, or the threat 
631 
171. Id. § 3(b)(l). The preemption clause in my proposed bill is far more limited. 
This reflects the more limited scope of the bill. 
172. Id. §§ 3(b)(2)(3) and (4). 
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of such contamination or pollu-
tion, caused by any product de-
fined by State or Federal law as 
a toxic substance or waste, haz-
ardous substance or material, 
hazardous waste or other con-
taminant or pollutant; 
(B) a right arising under the com-
mon law of a State to bring an 
action to abate a nuisance or 
otherwise protect against con-
tamination or pollution of the 
environment, or the threat of 
such contamination or pollution, 
caused by any product; or 
(C) any law relating to a civil action 
for loss or damage, cleanup 
costs, civil penalties or injunc-
tive relief, if the loss or damage 
for which a remedy is sought 
was caused by the release into 
the environment, or the threat of 
release into the environment, of 
a toxic substance or waste, haz-
ardous substance or material, 
hazardous waste or other con-
taminant or pollutant. 
(2) As used in this subsection-
(A) "contaminant or pollutant" in-
cludes (i) anything defined or 
designated as a contaminant or 
pollutant under any Federal or 
State law, and (ii) any element, 
substance, compound, mixture, 
or organism which, after release 
into the environment and upon 
exposure, ingestion, inhalation, 
impact, attachment, or assimila-
tion into any organism either di-
rectly from the environment or 
indirectly by ingestion through 
food chains, will or may reason-
ably be anticipated to cause 
death, disease, injury, behav-
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ioral abnormalities, cancer, ge-
netic mutation, physiological 
malfunctions (including malfunc-
tions in reproduction), or physi-
cal deformations, in such orga-
nisms or their offspring; 
(B) "environment" has the meaning 
given to such term in section 
101(8) of the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(42 u.s.c. § 9601(8) (1982)); 
(C) "hazardous substance" has the 
meaning given to such term in 
section 101(14) of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. § 
9601(14) (1982)); 
(D) "hazardous waste" has the 
meaning given to such term in 
section 101(29) of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. § 
9601(29) (1982)); 
(E) "law" means any law or author-
ity, whether statutory or com-
mon; and 
(F) "release" has the meaning given 
to such term in section 101(22) 
of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980 (42 
U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982)), and, in 
addition, the term includes any 
depositing or placing into the 
environment.173 
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173. Id. § 3(c)(l). The drafters of S. 100 included these sections to satisfy the states' 
attorneys general who were concerned about the possible impact of a federal product 
liability act on environmental torts. The exclusions make it clear that environmental 
torts are not covered by the Act. 
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STANDARDS FOR PRODUCT DESIGN AND 
WARNING 
Sec. 4. In any product liability action in which the 
claimant alleges that the product is defective because 
of improper design, failure to warn, or failure to pro-
vide adequate instructions, the manufacturer or prod-
uct seller shall be liable to the claimant only if the 
claimant establishes by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the manufacturer or the product seller was 
negligent, in that the conduct which brought about the 
defective condition of the product resulted from. the 
failure to act as a reasonable manufacturer or product 
seller under the same or similar circumstances. The 
standard of care set forth herein shall govern whether 
the action is based on (A) strict liability or absolute li-
ability; (B) breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability; or (C) breach of implied warranty of 
fitness for particular purpose. Nothing set forth herein 
shall prevent a claimant from bringing a cause of ac-
tion for express warranty or any intentional tort. m 
RESPONSIBILITY OF PRODUCT SELLERS 
Sec. 5. A product seller shall be treated as the 
manufacturer of a product and shall be liable for 
harm to the claimant caused by a product as if it 
were the manufacturer of the product if-
(1) the manufacturer is not subject to ser-
vice of process under the laws of the 
State in which the action is brought; 
or 
(2) the court determines that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the claim-
ant would be unable to enforce a judg-
ment against the manufacturer.176 
174. This section is totally new and reflects the author's view of a simple and 
straightforward articulation of the negligence standard. 
175. This section reflects the goals set forth in § 8 of S. 100, supra note I. It deletes 
many of the provisions of S. 100 because this bill does not purport to set forth all the 
elements of a product liability cause of action. When § 5 is put together with § 4, most of 
the substantive goals of § 8, S. 100 are accomplished. An intermediate products seller 
will be strictly liable for production defects (as if it were a manufacturer) if the provisos 
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EFFECT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS 
Sec. 6(a). In the case of any product liability 
claim brought by or on behalf of an injured per-
son entitled to compensation under any State or 
Federal workers' compensation law, damages 
shall be reduced by the amount paid as workers' 
compensation benefits for the same injury plus 
the present value of all future workers' compen-
sation benefits payable for the same injury 
under the workers' compensation law. 
(b) Unless the manufacturer or product seller 
has expressly agreed to indemnify or hold 
an employer harmless for harm to an em-
ployee caused by a product, neither the em-
ployer nor the workers' compensation in-
surance carrier of the employer shall have 
a right of subrogation, contribution, or im-
plied indemnity against the manufacturer 
or product seller or a lien against the 
claimant's recovery from the manufacturer 
or product, seller, if the harm arose from 
the sale of a defective product by the man-
ufacturer or product seller. 
(c) In any product liability action in which 
damages are sought for harm for which the 
person injured is or would have been enti-
tled to receive compensation under any 
State or Federal workers' compensation 
law, no third-party tortfeasor may main-
tain any action for implied indemnity or 
contribution against the employer or any 
coemployee of the person who was 
injured. 178 
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of§ 5(1) or (2) are triggered. The intermediate seller will also be liable for the manufac-
turer's design defects, failure to warn, or failure to adequately instruct according to the 
provision of§ 4 if the provisos of§ 5(1) or (2) are triggered. Section 5(2) reflects a change 
in language which would require a court to determine that there is a "reasonable likeli-
hood" that the claimant would be unable to enforce a judgment against the manufac-
turer. In any event, it should be noted that under § 4, an intermediate seller is liable for 
its own primary negligence. 
176. This section is an amalgam of language from MUPLA, suprr;z note 2, § 114, and 
S. 100, supra note 2, § 10. 
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Sec. 7(a). Punitive damages may be awarded to 
the claimant if the claimant proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that the harm suffered was 
the result of the product seller's reckless disre-
gard for the safety of product users, consumers, 
or others who might be harmed by the product. 
(b) The trier of fact shall determine whether 
punitive damages should be awarded, and 
the amount of those damages, if any. In 
making this determination, the trier of fact 
shall consider: 
(1) The likelihood at the relevant time 
that serious harm would arise from 
the product seller's misconduct; 
(2) The degree of the product seller's 
awareness of that likelihood; 
(3) The profitability of the misconduct to 
the product seller; 
(4) The duration of the misconduct and 
any concealment of it by the product 
seller; 
(5) The attitude and conduct of the prod-
uct seller upon discovery of the mis-
conduct and whether the conduct has 
been terminated; 
(6) The financial condition of the product 
seller; 
(7) The total effect of other punishment 
imposed or likely to be imposed upon 
the product seller as a result of the 
misconduct, including punitive dam-
age awards to persons similarly situ-
ated to the claimant and the severity 
of criminal penalties to which the 
product seller has been or may be 
subjected; and 
(8) Whether the harm suffered by the 
claimant was also the result of the 
claimant's own reckless disregard for 
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personal safety.177 
PRODUCT LIABILITY REVIEW PANEL 
Sec. 8(a). The Judicial Conference of the United 
States shall establish a Product Liability Dam-
ages Review Panel (hereinafter in this section 
referred to as the "Panel") to conduct the studies 
required by this section. The Panel shall consist 
of three individuals selected on the basis of their 
expertise regarding civil actions and recovery 
for loss or damage caused by a product. 
(b) The Panel shall conduct an empirical study 
of damages in relation to the product liabil-
ity litigation system. As part of this study 
the Panel shall evaluate-
( 1) the nature and adequacy of damages 
in providing recovery for any loss or 
damage caused by a product; 
(2) the relationship between economic 
loss and pain and suffering damages; · 
(3) whether damage awards differ among 
product categories and location of 
litigation; 
(4) whether damage awards for economic 
loss, pain and suffering, and punitive 
damages differ depending on claim-
ants' economic status, sex, race, or 
ethnic origin; 
(5) the financial impact on industry and 
consumers of punitive damage 
awards; 
(6) the impact of attorneys' fees on the 
product liability system; and 
(7) all such other relationships between 
damages and the operation of the 
product liability system that the 
Panel shall see fit to investigate. 
(c) The results of the study shall be submitted 
to the Congress within 2 years after the 
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177. This section borrows heavily from MUPLA, supra note 2, § 120. Unlike 
MUPLA, damages are determined by the jury. 
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date of enactment of this Act. 
(d) A member of the Panel who is not an officer 
or employee of the Federal Government. 
shall be entitled to receive compensation at 
a rate of basic pay in effect for grade GS-18 
of the General Schedule pursuant to section 
5;332 of Title 5, United States Code, for 
each day (including travel time) during 
which the member is engaged in the actual 
performance of the duties of the Panel. 
(e) There are authorized to be appropriated 
for the purposes of this section such sums 
as may be necessary in fiscal year 1985. 
Such sums shall remain available until 
expended.178 
REVIEW ABILITY 
Sec. 9. It is the intent of the Congress that, in 
other than exceptional cases, the Supreme Court 
of the United States shall not review issues re-
lating solely to the sufficiency of the evidence in 
cases arising under this Act which have been fi-
nally decided by the highest court of any State.179 
178. This section is new and reflects the author's view of the necessity of empirical 
data about damages before adequate alternative compensation systems can be proposed. 
179. This provision's source is S. 100, supra note 1, § 18. 
